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As a result of the Child Poverty Act (2010), current and future governments are 
committed to reducing the rate of relative income child poverty in the UK to 10% 
by 2020–21. This paper looks in detail at the progress made towards this goal 
under the previous Labour administrations. Direct tax and benefit reforms are 
very important in explaining at least three things: the large overall reduction in 
child poverty since 1998–99; the striking slowdown in progress towards the 
child poverty targets between 2004–05 and 2007–08; and some of the variation 
in child poverty trends between different groups of children. However, some of 
the child poverty-reducing impact of those reforms acted simply to stop child 
poverty rising as real earnings grew over the period, which increases median 
income and thus the relative poverty line. The performance of parents in the 
labour market is important too: between regions, parental employment and child 
poverty trends are closely related; the overall reduction in child poverty since 
1998–99 has been helped by higher lone parent employment rates; and the 
overall rise in child poverty since 2004–05 has been most concentrated on 
children of one-earner couples, whose real earnings have fallen. 
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1.  Introduction 
This paper provides a retrospective analysis of child poverty  in the UK since 
1998–99.  It  aims  to  inform  policy  debate  in  advance  of  Frank  Field  MP’s 
Independent Review on Poverty and Life Chances2, which is due to report at the 
end of 2010, and the Government’s child poverty strategy, which it has to publish 
by the end of March 2011. 
We do not consider the wider issues of how poverty should be measured and 
what (if any) poverty targets a government should have. As a result of the Child 
Poverty Act (2010), current and future governments are already committed to 
reducing the rate of relative income child poverty in the UK to 10% by 2020–21. 
This  paper  looks  in  detail  at  the  progress  made  towards  this  goal  under  the 
previous Labour administrations.  
We  begin  by  briefly  outlining  the  child  poverty  targets  set  by  the  Labour 
Government  in  1999  (Section  2),  and  describing  the  progress  made  towards 
these targets since 1998–99 (Section 3). We then use decomposition analysis to 
identify the key groups who have been driving the changes in child poverty since 
1998–99  (Section  4),  before  looking  in  detail  at  the  impact  of  direct  tax  and 
benefit reforms on child poverty over this period (Section 5). Finally we look at 
labour  market  trends  for  parents  over  the  period  (Section  6).  Section  7 
concludes. 
2.  Policy background: child poverty targets 
In March 1999 the Labour Government announced an unprecedented target to 
‘eradicate’ child poverty by 2020–21, along with interim child poverty targets for 
2004–05 and 2010–11. 
The first interim target was for child poverty in Britain in 2004–05 to be one-
quarter lower than its 1998–99 level, using a poverty line of 60% of median 
household income: this was narrowly missed (see Section 3). The second interim 
target was for child poverty in the UK in 2010–11 to be one-half its 1998–99 
level. Progress towards the 2010–11 target was assessed using three definitions 
of poverty: a relative low income indicator, an absolute low income indicator and 
a combined relative low income and material deprivation indicator. The relative 
low income indicator used a poverty line of 60% of median household before 
housing costs3 (BHC) income; the absolute low income indicator used a poverty 
line of 60% of the 1998 –99  BHC  median  (in  real  terms);  and  the  combined 
relative low income and material deprivation indicator classified a child as being 
in poverty if its household BHC income is below 70% of the median and it is 
                                                      
2 See http://povertyreview.independent.gov.uk. 
3 Incomes can be measured before or after housing costs have been deducted (BHC or AHC).  
Because the government’s child poverty targets related to BHC income, we focus on that in this 
paper. Results of our simulations in Section 5 are, however, repeated for AHC incomes in 
Appendix 2. 3 
 
materially deprived (as determined by answers to a series of questions about 
what its family can afford to do). 
The Child Poverty Act (2010)4 commits the government to the ‘eradication’ of 
child poverty by 2020. In addition to the three measures of child poverty used 
for the 2010 targets, an indicator of ‘persistent’ poverty will also be used for the 
2020 targets5. This classifies a child as being in poverty if it is in relative income 
poverty for at least 3 out of 4 consecutive calendar years. Reducing income 
poverty amongst children to zero is infeasible for at least 3 reasons: incomes are 
volatile in the short run, so there will always be some people with very low 
incomes at any point in time, e.g. due to self-employment losses or transition 
between jobs (clearly this applies less to the persistent poverty target); survey 
data is always subject to misreporting and the Family Resources Survey under-
records benefit and tax credit receipt (see Appendix C of Brewer et al, 2008); and 
the take-up rate for means-tested benefits and tax credits will never be 100%. 
Thus, the Act states that a rate of relative income poverty of 10% would be 
consistent with the eradication of child poverty, with the rationale that it would 
be a level comparable to the lowest in Europe (it would also be 3 percentage 
points lower than that achieved in the UK at any time since at least 1961); and 
the target rates for the absolute low income and combined relative low income 
and material deprivation indicator are 5%. The target rate of persistent poverty 
has yet to be set. In the meantime, the government is to publish a child poverty 
strategy by the end of March 2011 and set up a Child Poverty Commission.  
 
3.  How have children fared since 1998–99? 
We first examine how the whole distribution of household incomes for children 
has evolved since 1998–99, and then look at the progress made towards the 
2010–11 child poverty targets. All figures in this section draw on the Department 
for Work and Pensions’ Households Below Average Income (HBAI) series6, or the 
survey which underlies this series, the Family Resources Survey.   The income 
measure we refer to is net, equivalised 7, and at the household level 8 (for more 
details and discussion see Appendix A of Joyce et al, 2010). 
The distribution of household incomes for children in 1998–99 and 2008–09 
Before looking specifically at child poverty, it is informative to track changes in 
the whole distribution of household income for children between 1998–99 (the 
baseline against which the child poverty targets are defined) and 2008–09 (the 
                                                      
4 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/9/contents.
 
5 It should be noted that for the purposes of the Child Poverty Act (2010), the indicator of 
absolute poverty uses 2010-11 as a base year rather than 1998-99, as was used for the 2010 
child poverty target.  
6 See Department for Work and Pensions (2010) for the latest HBAI publication. 
7 The ‘base’ group for this equivalisation is couples with no children (i.e. the equivalisation 
procedure leaves the household incomes of couples with no children unchanged). 
8 Thus, children are assigned ‘incomes’ because of the incomes of other members of their 
household (typically their parents). 4 
 
latest year of data available). This gives us a general overview of how the living 
standards of children have evolved over the period, rather than just an overview 
of movements in and out of a particular measure of poverty. 
Figure 3.1 compares the distribution of household incomes for children in 1998–
99 and 2008–09, in 2008–09 prices.  We focus on children in Great Britain for 
this comparison, since Northern Ireland was not included in the official HBAI 
series until 2002–03.  In the upper two panels, the height of the bars represents 
the number of children in each £10 band of equivalised household income in 
1998–99 and 2008–09. In each case, the final bar of the graph groups together all 
children whose household income is £1,500 per week or more. The third panel 
shows more clearly how the shape of the distribution has changed over time, by 
comparing  kernel  density  estimates  for  1998–99  and  2008–09.  The  units  for 
these estimates are such that the total area under each plotted line is 1, rather 
than the size of the child population in the year in question. 
Looking at the lowest panel, we can see that the shape of the income distribution 
for children has changed in two striking ways. First, there has been a rightward 
shift as a result of general growth in the real incomes of families with children. 
Second, the peak of the distribution has become less distinct. Whereas in 1998–
99 there was a pronounced spike at the modal income, by 2008–09 there was a 
broader peak in the distribution between about £200 and £300 per week. Both of 
these trends closely mirror what has happened to the income distribution for all 
individuals in Great Britain in recent years (see Joyce et al, 20109). It is also 
striking that the pronounced spike in the 1998-99 distribution lay just below the 
relative  income  poverty  line  of  £209.  This  made  initial  reductions  in  child 
poverty after 1998–99 easier to achieve than if the distribution of children below 
the chosen poverty line had been less dense. In the next subsection, we consider 
whether  child  poverty  trends  over  the  last  decade  would  have  looked 
dramatically different if a different relative poverty line had been chosen. 
Figure  3.2  illustrates  the  real  average  annual  growth  in  household  incomes 
across the children’s income distribution between 1998–99 and 2008-09, and 
compares this with the corresponding numbers from previous decades. Children 
are ordered from lowest to highest on the basis of household income and split 
into 100 equally sized groups, called ‘percentile groups’. The Figure shows how 
average household income at the top of each percentile group has grown in real 
terms  for  each  10-year  period  between  1968  and  2008–09.  In  making  these 
comparisons, it is important to realise that these periods cover different stages of 
various  economic  cycles,  and  income  growth  rates  are  very  sensitive  to  this. 
Having noted this, the figure shows that, between 1998–99 and 2008–09, the 
strongest  growth  in  household  income  was  found  in  the  lower  half  of  the 
children’s  income  distribution,  approximately  between  the  10th  and  40th 
percentile  points.  The  pattern  of  household  income  growth  amongst  children 
was inequality-reducing (i.e. income growth was higher at lower points in the 
distribution)  across  a  large  majority  of  the  distribution.  This  contrasts  with 
                                                      
9 This IFS commentary presented the same analysis for all individuals in Great Britain, 
comparing 1996–97 with 2008–09. 5 
 
previous decades (and most starkly with the decade between 1978 and 1988) 
when the pattern of household income growth amongst children tended to be 
inequality-increasing. Real household income growth amongst children over the 
last decade has been higher at virtually all points of the distribution relative to 
the decades after 1968 and 1988. Relative to the period between 1978 and 1988, 
growth has been stronger across most of the bottom half of the distribution, but 
less strong in the top half. 
In the next subsection, we document in detail the trends in the government’s 
measures of child poverty between 1998–99 and 2008–09.   6 
 
Figure 3.1. The income distributions for children in 1998–99 and 2008–09 
compared (Great Britain) 
 
Notes: Incomes have been measured before housing costs have been deducted.  The right-most 
bar in the top two panels represents incomes of over £1,500 per week.  Incomes above £1,500 
have been excluded from the kernel densities in the final panel. Negative incomes (due to self-
employment losses, for example) are set to zero in the HBAI data. 
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Figure 3.2. The distribution of household income growth for children over 
10-year periods between 1968 and 2008–09 (Great Britain) 
 
Notes: Incomes have been measured before housing costs have been deducted.  1968, 1978 and 
1988 refer to calendar years; 1998 and 2008 refer to financial years. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Family Expenditure Survey, 1968, 1978 and 1988; and Family 
Resources Survey, 1998–99 and 2008–09. 

















































Child poverty: progress to date 
Table 3.1 reviews progress up to 2008–09 on all three measures of child poverty 
used to define the 2010–11 targets (see Section 2). It shows consistent declines 
in child poverty across all three measures between 1998–99 and 2004–05, but a 
less straightforward story thereafter. 
Table 3.1. Progress towards halving child poverty in the UK by 2010–11  










  %  Million  %  Million  %  Million 
1998–99  26.1  3.4  26.1  3.4  20.8  2.6 
1999–00  25.7  3.4  23.4  3.1     
2000–01  23.4  3.1  19.1  2.5     
2001–02  23.2  3.0  15.2  2.0     
2002–03  22.6  2.9  14.1  1.8     
2003–04  22.1  2.9  13.7  1.8     
2004–05  21.3  2.7  12.9  1.7  17.1  2.2 
2005–06  22.0  2.8  12.7  1.6  16.3  2.1 
2006–07  22.3  2.9  13.1  1.7  15.6  2.0 
2007–08  22.5  2.9  13.4  1.7  17.2  2.2 
2008–09  21.8  2.8  12.4  1.6  17.1  2.2 
             
Change since 1998–
99 
–4.2  –0.6  –13.6  –1.8  –3.7  –0.4 
Change since 2004–
05 
+0.5  +0.1  -0.5  -0.1  -0.0  -0.0 
             
Target for 2010–11  n/a  1.7  n/a  1.7  n/a  1.3 
Notes: Reported changes may not equal the differences between the corresponding numbers 
due to rounding. For the purposes of the child poverty target in 2010–11, the DWP has had to 
estimate the level of relative child poverty in the UK in 1998–99 (Northern Ireland was first 
included in the official HBAI series in 2002–03).   
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Family Resources Survey, various years; Department for 
Work and Pensions (2010).  UK poverty levels for the years 1998/99 through 2001/02 draw on 
the DWP’s imputed estimates of poverty levels in Northern Ireland over this period.  
The most watched of these measures is the pure relative poverty target, which is 
for child poverty in the UK in 2010–11 to be one-half lower than its level in 
1998–99, using a poverty line of 60% of median BHC income and the modified 
OECD equivalence scale. From now on, we refer to this measure unless otherwise 
stated.  As Table 3.1 shows, child poverty on this measure has fallen by 600,000 
to the nearest hundred thousand (or just under one-fifth) in the ten years since 9 
 
1998–99 and needs to fall by a further 1.1 million in the remaining two years 
until 2010–11 to meet this element of the target. Thus, child poverty needs to fall 
by  an  average  of  550,000  a  year  for  the  next  two  years,  having  fallen  by  an 
average of 64,000 a year for the past ten years.  
But Table 3.1 also highlights that simple comparisons of child poverty in 1998–
99 and 2008–09 mask two very different trends, with 2004–05 as the ‘turning 
point’. The reduction in child poverty between 1997–9810 and 2004–05 is by far 
the largest and most sustained since our comparable series began in 1961, and 
stands  in  stark  contrast  to  the  large  rise  under  the  previous  Conservative 
administrations between 1979 and 1996–97, as Figure 3.1 illustrates. The same 
is true of poverty in the whole population, but it was declining poverty amongst 
pensioners and families with children that drove the reduction in overall poverty 
between 1997–98 and 2004–05. 
Figure 3.3. Child poverty in the UK since 1961  
 
Notes: Years up to 1992 are calendar years; thereafter, years refer to financial years. Incomes 
are measured before housing costs have been deducted (BHC) and equivalised using the 
modified OECD equivalence scale. Figures before 2001 are for Great Britain, and figures from 
2002 onwards are for the whole United Kingdom (Northern Ireland was first included in the 
official HBAI series in 2002–03).  
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Family Expenditure Survey (up to 1993–94) and Family 
Resources Survey (1994–95 onwards).  
The 2004–05 interim target was only narrowly missed (by 100,000 measuring 
incomes BHC and by 300,000 measuring incomes AHC11) and hence, had the rate 
                                                      
10 For consistency, we use 1998–99 as the starting point throughout this briefing note, as that is 
the baseline against which the child poverty targets are defined, but the downward trend in 
child poverty actually started between 1997–98 and 1998–99. 
11 See Brewer, Goodman, Shaw and Sibieta (2006). Note that this was assessed using the 


























of reduction in child poverty between 1998–99 and 2004–05 continued, it would 
be close to target in 2010–1112. However, as Table 3.1 shows, child poverty rose 
in the three consecutive years after 2004–05. Despite a fall in 2008–09, child 
poverty remains higher than its recent low. In Sections 4, 5 and 6 we investigate 
the reasons for these contrasting trends before and after 2004–05. 
Would  trends  in  relative  income  child  poverty  since  1998–99  have  been 
different if a different relative poverty line had been used? 
A criticism that has been directed at a ‘binary’ or ‘headcount’ measure of poverty 
(i.e. a measure which simply classifies someone as ‘in poverty’ or ‘not in poverty’ 
with no account taken of the distance from the poverty line) is  that it skews 
incentives for policy-makers towards raising the incomes of those just below the 
poverty line so that they rise just above it, with relatively little priority attached 
to  the  rest of the  income  distribution13. With this in mind, here we consider 
whether  the  overall  fall  in  child  poverty  since  1998 –99  is  specific  to  the 
particular relative poverty line (60% of the median household income) chosen. 
Figure 3.4 reveals how child poverty would have changed over the last decade if 
the poverty line were not 60% of median income, but some other fraction, by 
showing  the  cumulative  distribution  function  of  household  BHC  income  for 
children in both 1998–99 and 2008–09. This gives the proportion of children 
(vertical axis) with incomes no greater than some fraction of the median income 
(horizontal axis); or, equivalently, the child poverty rate for all possible relative 
income poverty lines up to the median income. It shows that child poverty would 
have fallen over the period if the relative poverty line had been anything from 
43% up to 100% of the median household income14; and the precise reduction in 
child poverty over the period would have been very similar for all poverty lines 
between  55%  and  75%  of  the  median  (the  poverty  line  that  would  have 
maximised the reduction in child poverty between 1998 –99 and 2008–09 is in 
fact 65% of median income). Thus, there is not striking evidence that policy-
makers have been focusing efforts on a narrow set of children just below their 
chosen poverty line15. 
                                                                                                                                                        
that the numbers presented in this paragraph differ from those in the rest of this chapter and 
are not directly comparable to future targets in 2010 and 2020.  
12 This is true because the 2010–11 target requires exactly twice as large a reduction in child 
poverty (compared to 1998–99 levels) as the 2004–05 target. 
13 For example, see Frank Field MP’s newspaper article of 5th June 2010: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/conservative/7803983/Poverty-is-
about-much-more-than-money.html. 
14 Thus, child poverty has not necessarily fallen over the period if very low poverty lines are 
used.  But IFS researchers have previously argued that relative income poverty measures using 
such low poverty lines would not be informative measures of ‘severe poverty’, due to the 
volatility of incomes and measurement error at the bottom of the income distribution – see 
Brewer, Phillips and Sibieta (2010). 
15 Note that, of course, trends over time may not be (entirely) the deliberate result of policy in 
any case; and the HBAI series does not track the same people over time, so we do not know 
what has happened to the household incomes of children who were in poverty in 1998–99. 11 
 
Figure 3.4. Cumulative distribution function of household incomes for 
children in 1998–99 and 2008–09 (Great Britain)  
 
Notes: Incomes have been measured before housing costs have been deducted. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using Family Resources Survey, 1998–99 and 2008–09. 
 
4.  Decomposing the changes in child poverty since 1998–99 
Which groups of children have driven the overall trends in child poverty? 
We can learn about what has driven changes in child poverty since 1998–99 with 
simple decomposition analyses.  We define all children as belonging to one of a 
number of groups, and then separate all changes in child poverty into incidence 
effects – which represent changes in the risk of poverty for children in particular 
groups – and compositional effects – which reflect changes in the distribution of 
children between these groups.16 We have defined these groups according to a 
number of different characteristics, such as family  type and employment status, 
number of children in the family, and so on, to build up a picture of the statistical 
drivers of recent trends in child poverty.  In this section we have selected a few 
of these decompositions to present.  Others can be found in Appendix 117. 
Given the contrasting trends in child poverty before and after 2004 –05  (see 
Section 3), in Tables 4.1 to 4.4 we present separate decompositions of changes 
between 1998–99 and 2004–05 and between 2004–05 and 2008–09, as well as 
for the whole period between 1998–99 and 2008–09. 
                                                      
16 For more details, see appendix D of Brewer, Goodman, Shaw and Sibieta (2006). The authors 
acknowledge that they were motivated to present these decompositions by the analysis in 
Sutherland, Sefton and Piachaud (2003).  
17 The decompositions in Appendix 1 involve grouping children according to the following 














































Table  4.1  presents  a  simple  decomposition  by  family  type,  grouping  children 
according to whether they are in a lone parent or couple family. Incidence effects 
- changes in the risk of poverty for children in lone parent and couple families – 
dominate  the  compositional  effects,  reflecting  the  unsurprising  fact  that  the 
relative numbers of lone parent and couple parent families have not changed 
dramatically. Notably, the fall in child poverty between 1998–99 and 2004–05 
was driven by falls in the risk of poverty for both lone parent and couple parent 
families, but the rise between 2004–05 and 2008–09 was driven by a rise in the 
poverty  risk  for  children  of  couples.  Had  the  risk  of  poverty  for  children  of 
couples been the same in 2008–09 as in 2004–05, child poverty would have been 
1.4 percentage points lower in 2008–09 than it actually was. 
We investigate this further in Table 4.2, splitting children up by both family type 
and  employment  status.  This  reveals  that  children  of  couples  of  almost  all 
employment statuses experienced lower poverty risks in 2004–05 than in 1998–
99, but higher poverty risks in 2008–09 than 2004–05.  Particularly important in 
accounting for the overall changes in child poverty in both periods are couples   
where one person works full time and the other does not work.  For lone parents, 
the reductions in the risk of poverty both before and after 2004–05 are due to 
reduced poverty risks for lone parents who work part-time and those who do not 
work at all – the poverty risk for those who work full-time has actually risen very 
slightly.  For  the  whole  period  between  1998–99  and  2008–09,  there  are 
important compositional effects (though the incidence effects still account for 
more  of  the  changes  in  child  poverty):    reduced  proportions  of  zero-earner 
families (both couples and lone parents) have acted to lower child poverty by 1.5 
percentage points over this period. 
Table 4.3 splits children up according to the number of children in their family. It 
shows that the overall fall in child poverty between 1998–99 and 2008–09 is 
very largely accounted for by compositional and incidence effects for families 
with 3 or more children: fewer children belong to such families in 2008–09 than 
in 1998–99, down from about one third to about one quarter (this acts to reduce 
child  poverty  because  such  families  have  the  highest  poverty  risk);  and  the 
poverty risk amongst such families has fallen.  The latter (incidence) effect is 
entirely  due  to  the  dramatic  reduction  in  the  poverty  risk  for  those  families 
between 1998–99 and 2004–05, when it fell from 40% to 30%. The poverty risk 
for 2-child families has changed relatively little, and the poverty risk for 1-child 
families has actually risen slightly.  
In Table 4.4 we instead split children up according to the age of the youngest 
child in the family.  Here, the dominant picture is one of reduced poverty risks 
for families with young children driving the reduction in child poverty over the 
last 10 years (again, this is entirely due to the trend before 2004–05). Families 
with a youngest child aged 11 or more have actually experienced an increase in 
poverty risk since 1998–99. This pattern has significantly narrowed the gap in 
poverty rates between families with younger and older children, though those 
with younger children are still at a higher risk of poverty. There is reason to 
believe that direct tax and benefit reforms since 1998–99 may be at least partly 13 
 
responsible for this convergence of poverty risks between families with younger 
and older children, since benefit and tax credit entitlements for such families 
have  tended to  converge  as  well. We  investigate this  in Section  5, where  we 
explicitly simulate the impact of tax and benefit reforms since 1998–99. 
Finally, Table 4.5 splits children up by region. It shows that the reduction in child 
poverty between 1998–99 and 2004–05 was common to most regions, and most 
striking in the North West. Between 2004–05 and 2008–09, the West Midlands 
stands out as the largest driver of the increase in child poverty: had the child 
poverty rate in that region alone remained constant after 2004–05, child poverty 
in Great Britain in 2008–09 would have been 0.7 percentage points lower than it 
actually was. Reductions in child poverty within London since 2004–05 have 
however acted to reduce child poverty in Great Britain by 0.5 percentage points. 
Taking the period between 1998–99 and 2008–09 as a whole, the West Midlands 
is the only region that experienced a rise in child poverty18. Unsurprisingly, there 
are no notable compositional effects, as relative regional populations do not tend 
to change dramatically over short periods of time. Nevertheless, it is notable that 
the relative child populations in the southern regions have grown over the 
decade (this could be due to regional differences in the age profile of children in 
1998–99, fertility rates, internal migration, or foreign migration).
                                                      
18 The rise in child poverty in the West Midlands of 7 percentage points between 1998–
99 and 2008–09 is sensitive to the particular base year chosen – 1998–99 was a low 
point for child poverty in that region and it had been 5 percentage points higher in the 
previous year. Nevertheless, the general story remains the same if we take three year 
moving averages: child poverty in the West Midlands rose between 1997–98 to 1999–
2000 and 2006–07 to 2008–09, and this is entirely due to the trend after 2003–04 to 
2005–06. 14 
 
Table 4.1. Decomposition of changes in BHC child poverty between 1998–99 and 2008–09 by family type  
Notes: Great Britain only. Figures may not sum due to rounding. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Family Resources Surveys 1998–99, 2004–05 and 2008–09. 
 
 
   
 
Child poverty rate 
(%) 
Proportion of 












































parents  45.7  37.3  35.0  22.8  24.5  24.1  +0.3  -2.0  -1.7  -0.1  -0.6  -0.6  +0.2  -2.5  -2.3 
Couple 
parents  20.2  16.2  18.0  77.2  75.5  75.9  +0.1  -3.0  -3.0  +0.0  +1.4  +1.4  +0.1  -1.7  -1.6 
All  26.0  21.3  22.1  100  100  100  +0.4  -5.0  -4.7  -0.1  +0.8  +0.8  +0.3  -4.2  -3.9 15 
 
Table 4.2. Decomposition of changes in BHC child poverty between 1998–99 and 2008–09 by family type and work status  
Notes: Great Britain only. Figures may not sum due to rounding. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Family Resources Surveys 1998–99, 2004–05 and 2008–09. 
  Child poverty rate 
(%) 
Proportion of 












































parents                               
Full-time  8.5  10.1  12.3  4.0  4.7  5.7  -0.1  +0.1  +0.0  -0.1  +0.1  +0.0  -0.2  +0.2  -0.1 
Part-time  28.7  19.7  18.8  5.0  7.0  6.6  +0.0  -0.5  -0.5  +0.0  -0.1  -0.1  +0.0  -0.6  -0.6 
Workless  62.5  56.9  55.1  13.8  12.8  11.8  -0.4  -0.7  -1.1  -0.3  -0.2  -0.6  -0.7  -0.9  -1.7 
Couple 
parents                               
Self-
employed  25.5  23.8  21.7  11.5  11.8  11.1  +0.0  -0.2  -0.2  +0.0  -0.2  -0.3  +0.0  -0.4  -0.4 
Two full-












52.0  42.0  53.0  4.3  4.4  5.8  +0.0  -0.4  -0.4  +0.4  +0.6  +0.9  +0.4  +0.0  +0.5 
Workless  73.5  62.3  64.0  7.2  6.1  5.5  -0.5  -0.7  -1.2  -0.3  +0.1  -0.2  -0.8  -0.6  -1.4 
All  26.0  21.3  22.1  100  100  100  -0.8  -3.8  -4.7  -0.3  +1.1  +0.8  -1.2  -2.7  -3.9 16 
 
Table 4.3. Decomposition of changes in BHC child poverty between 1998–99 and 2008–09 by number of children in family  
Notes: Great Britain only. Figures may not sum due to rounding. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Family Resources Surveys 1998–99, 2004–05 and 2008–09. 
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1 child  17.2  17.2  19.0  23.2  25.5  28.5  -0.1  +0.0  -0.1  -0.1  +0.5  +0.4  -0.3  +0.5  +0.2 
2 children  20.3  18.2  18.6  44.2  44.8  45.3  +0.0  -0.9  -0.9  +0.0  +0.1  +0.1  +0.0  -0.8  -0.8 
3+ 
children  40.1  29.5  31.5  32.6  29.7  26.3  -0.3  -3.3  -3.6  -0.3  +0.6  +0.2  -0.7  -2.5  -3.3 
All  26.0  21.3  22.1  100  100  100  -0.5  -4.2  -4.7  -0.4  +1.2  +0.8  -1.1  -2.8  -3.9 17 
 
Table 4.4. Decomposition of changes in BHC child poverty in  between 1998–99 and 2008–09 by age of youngest child in family  
Notes: Great Britain only. Figures may not sum due to rounding. 
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0-4 years  30.8  24.0  24.3  42.7  40.6  43.6  -0.1  -2.9  -2.9  +0.1  +0.1  +0.2  +0.0  -2.8  -2.8 
5-10 years  26.1  19.9  21.0  33.8  34.0  29.6  +0.0  -2.1  -2.1  +0.1  +0.3  +0.4  +0.0  -1.6  -1.6 
11+ years  17.1  19.0  19.7  23.6  25.4  26.8  -0.1  +0.5  +0.4  +0.0  +0.2  +0.2  -0.2  +0.7  +0.5 
All  26.0  21.3  22.1  100  100  100  -0.2  -4.5  -4.7  +0.1  +0.7  +0.8  -0.1  -3.8  -3.9 18 
 
Table 4.5. Decomposition of changes in BHC child poverty between 1998–99 and 2008–09 by region  
Notes: Great Britain only. Figures may not sum due to rounding. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Family Resources Surveys 1998–99, 2004–05 and 2008–09. 
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North East  37.2  30.6  28.5  4.5  4.3  4.2  -0.0  -0.3  -0.3  -0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.0  -0.4  -0.4 




31.6  24.4  27.1  8.9  8.9  8.8  -0.0  -0.6  -0.6  -0.0  +0.2  +0.2  -0.0  -0.4  -0.4 
East 
Midlands  25.1  21.4  21.3  7.3  7.4  7.4  -0.0  -0.3  -0.3  +0.0  -0.0  -0.0  -0.0  -0.3  -0.3 
West 
Midlands  25.2  25.4  32.6  9.6  9.5  9.5  -0.0  +0.0  +0.0  -0.0  +0.7  +0.7  -0.0  +0.7  +0.7 
Eastern  18.0  14.5  17.0  9.3  9.5  9.7  -0.0  -0.3  -0.3  -0.0  +0.2  +0.2  -0.0  -0.1  -0.1 
London  26.4  27.0  23.5  12.6  12.8  13.0  +0.0  +0.1  +0.1  +0.0  -0.5  -0.4  +0.0  -0.4  -0.4 
South East  15.7  13.7  14.3  13.7  14.0  14.3  -0.0  -0.3  -0.3  -0.0  +0.1  +0.1  -0.0  -0.2  -0.3 
South West  23.5  16.2  17.3  8.1  8.3  8.3  -0.0  -0.6  -0.6  -0.0  +0.1  +0.1  -0.0  -0.5  -0.5 
Wales  29.4  24.2  20.5  5.1  5.1  5.0  -0.0  -0.3  -0.3  +0.0  -0.2  -0.2  -0.0  -0.4  -0.5 
Scotland  27.5  21.1  21.5  8.5  8.2  8.0  -0.0  -0.5  -0.5  -0.0  +0.0  +0.0  -0.0  -0.5  -0.5 
All  26.0  21.3  22.1  100  100  100  -0.1  -4.6  -4.7  -0.0  +0.8  +0.8  -0.2  -3.7  -3.9 19 
 
Accounting for a number of characteristics simultaneously: Blinder-Oaxaca 
decompositions  
In  the  previous  subsection,  we  examined  the  mechanics  of  changes  in  child 
poverty  in  recent  years  by  splitting  children  into  groups  based  on  various 
different characteristics.  Here, we use a decomposition technique suggested by 
Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) which is based on Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS)  regressions  in  which  all  of  these  characteristics  are  controlled  for 
simultaneously19.  This  technique has two key advantages. First, by controlling 
for  characteristics  simultaneously,  we  can  disentangle  the  importance  of 
characteristics that are correlated with each other (for example, parental age and 
the number of children in the family ). Second, because the decomposition is 
derived from the results of regressions which include an intercept term, we can  
identify ‘secular’ trends in child poverty that are  not explained by any of the 
characteristics we control for.  
In these decompositions, there are three types of ‘effect’ that a characteristic can 
have  on  the  child  poverty  rate.  First  and  second,  there  are  incidence  and 
compositional  effects.    The  key  differences  between  these  effects  and  their 
namesakes in the previous section are that we are now controlling for several 
characteristics simultaneously and that we are now allowing for a ‘secular trend’ 
that  affects  all  groups.  Take  housing  tenure  as  an  example.  If,  conditional on 
everything else we are controlling for, the risk of poverty for those in the largest 
housing tenure group (homeowners) increases relative to other groups, then the 
incidence effect of housing tenure acts to increase poverty.  If the housing tenure 
group with the highest risk of poverty, conditional on everything else we control 
for, increases in relative size, then the compositional effect of housing tenure acts 
to increase poverty. Note that, because this kind of decomposition allows us to 
identify a secular trend - a change in child poverty that is not accounted for by 
any of the characteristics we control for – the incidence effect of, say, housing 
tenure, could act to increase child poverty even if parents of all housing tenure 
types experience reductions in poverty risks (or vice versa).  This is because a 
uniform reduction in the poverty risk across groups would represent a secular 
trend, not an incidence effect. Clearly, secular trends are of potential interest in 
their own right. 
The third effect is an ‘interaction’ effect, arising because groups can experience 
changes in relative size and changes in poverty risk (conditional on everything 
else we control for) simultaneously – as we saw in the previous subsection, this 
has happened for families with 3 or more children over the last decade. 
Since  our  outcome  of  interest  –  being  in  poverty  -  is  binary,  OLS  estimation 
implies  a  linear  probability  model.  For  the  usual  reasons,  we  would  like  to 
estimate  probabilities  with  a  nonlinear  model,  since  probabilities  cannot  be 
linear in the regressors unless restrictions are imposed on the set of values that 
regressors can take (which in this case would lack theoretical justification). The 
extent  to  which  this  matters  depends  upon  the  size  of  the  change  in  the 
                                                      
19 See Jann (2008) for an overview of this technique and its implementation. 20 
 
distribution of characteristics in the population over the period in question. The 
bigger the change, the more likely it is that the regressor values in the start-year 
and end-year populations lack common support20, and thus the more likely  a 
linear  probability  model  is  to  give  misleading  results  (suc h  as  predicted 
probabilities that do not lie between zero and one ). However, the results we 
obtain are consistent with those we obtain using non -linear techniques21, so we 
are confident that the linear probability model is a reasonable approximation. 
The characteristics that we control for simultaneously follow closely the set of 
characteristics that we controlled for in isolation in Tables 4.1 to 4.5 and in 
Appendix 1. The exceptions are ethnicity and disability status, which we exclude 
from the analysis he re. This is because they both result in very imbalanced 
classifications (i.e. very large majorities of the population are white and non -
disabled). This reduces the precision of the estimation and means that very small 
differences in poverty trends between  (for example) disabled and non-disabled 
people  will  look  very  important  simply  because  the  vast  majority  of  the 
population are non-disabled. We include two different regression specifications 
on which the decompositions are based. In the first, we control  for family type 
and exclude work status; in the second, we control for family type and work 
status jointly (these correspond to the classifications shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 
respectively). The rationale for excluding work status in the first variant is that it 
is likely to be a major determinant of poverty trends for any group, whether that 
group is defined by number of children, region, etc. Thus, if the aim is to examine 
poverty  trends  amongst  different  demographic  groups,  we  want  to  capture 
(rather than ‘control away’) the effect on poverty of differences in employment 
probabilities between these groups. However, it is also interesting to include a 
variant where we do control for work status, in order to quantify the effect of 
changing employment patterns on child poverty. 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 present the results of the Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions, for 
the first and second variants respectively. The underlying regression results are 
available from the authors on request. Again, we decompose the changes in child 
poverty between 1998–99 and 2004–05, 2004–05 and 2008–09, and the whole 
period between 1998–99 and 2008–09.  
Looking  first  at  the  4.7  percentage  point  reduction  in  child  poverty  between 
1998–99 and 2004–05, Tables 4.6 and 4.7 suggest that this was due to a strong 
secular trend, largely unrelated to changes that were specific to children with 
particular characteristics (of those characteristics that we control for, as always). 
In fact, the most significant incidence effect over this period – from parental age - 
                                                      
20 The common support assumption is less restrictive here than it might be, because all 
of our regressors are discrete. 
21 Specifically, the compositional effects of each variable are similar to those obtained 
using the Fairlie decomposition (Stata command ‘fairlie’); and the total incidence, 
compositional and interactions effects across all variables are very similar to those 
obtained using a Bauer-Sinning non-linear decomposition (Stata command 
‘nldecompose’ – see Bauer and Sinning, 2008). Details available from the authors on 
request. 21 
 
acted to increase child poverty. This is driven by the fact that parents between 35 
and 45 – the largest group – were less likely to be in poverty in 1998–99 than 
other  parents,  but  more  likely  in  2004–05  (i.e.  their  poverty  risk  increased 
relative to other groups), conditional on the other characteristics that we control 
for. 
When we  control for family type and work status in Table  4.7,  we  see more 
evidence  of  the  child-poverty  reducing  impact  of  increases  in  parental 
employment between 1998–99 and 2004–05: this lies behind the ‘compositional 
effect’  that  acted  to  reduce  child  poverty  by  0.7  percentage  points  over  that 
period. 
Turning to the 0.8 percentage point increase in child poverty between 2004–05 
and 2008–09, the results are again dominated by a large secular trend, this time 
of  rising  child  poverty.  The  fact  that  child  poverty  rose  by  a  relatively  small 
amount is accounted for by the fact that the poverty rate rose less for children 
with older parents and for children of homeowners (conditional on the other 
characteristics we control for), who are majority groups. 
Looking finally at the period between 1998–99 and 2008–09 as a whole, Table 
4.6  shows  a  significant  downwards  secular  trend  in  child  poverty,  but  an 
‘incidence effect’ from family type that acts to partly offset this. This is because 
the poverty risk amongst couple parents, who are a majority, has fallen by less 
than the poverty risk amongst lone parents (note that the poverty risk has fallen 
for both types of parent, but this is attributed to the ‘secular trend’), conditional 
on other characteristics. In Table 4.7, where we also control for work status, we 
see  a  secular  trend  of  virtually  zero  and  instead  a  significant  ‘compositional 
effect’ from family type and work status acting to reduce child poverty: again, 
this reflects the increase in parental employment over the period, as employed 
parents are much less likely to be in poverty. As with the period between 2004–
05 and 2008–09, ‘housing tenure’ has acted to reduce child poverty over the 
decade because home-owning parents (the majority) have seen relatively rapid 
falls in their poverty risk, conditional on other characteristics. 
A  key  insight  from  these  Blinder-Oaxaca  decompositions  is  the  sharply 
contrasting secular trends in child poverty before and after 2004–05, unrelated 
to trends that were specific to children with any particular characteristics (of 
those we control for). Trends in the generosity of benefit and tax credit reforms 
towards families with children are one potential explanation. In the next section 
we investigate whether direct tax and benefit policy can indeed account for the 
contrasting trends before and after 2004–05.   22 
 
Table 4.6. Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of changes in child poverty between 1998–99 and 2008–09 (Great Britain), controlling 
for family type, number of children, age of youngest child, parental age, housing tenure and region. 
  1998–99 to 2004–05  2004–05 to 2008–09  1998–99 to 2008–09 


















Family type   +0.2   +0.4   +0.0   -0.0   +1.2   -0.0   +0.1   +1.6   +0.1  
Number of 
children  -0.3   +0.2   -0.2   -0.4   -0.2   +0.0   -0.8   +0.3   -0.5  
Age of 
youngest child  -0.0   -0.4   -0.1   +0.1   -0.1   0.1   +0.1   -0.5   -0.1  
Parental age  +0.1   +1.7   +0.1   +0.3   -2.0   -0.1   +0.4   -0.4   +0.0  
Housing tenure  -0.5   -0.5   -0.0   -0.2   -1.0   -0.0   -0.8   -1.4   -0.0  
Region  -0.1   +0.1   -0.0   -0.0   +0.2   +0.0   -0.1   +0.4   -0.1  
Total  -0.6   +1.6   -0.3   -0.4   -1.8  -0.1   -1.1   +0.1   -0.5  
‘Secular’ trend  -5.3  +3.0  -2.3 
Change in 
child poverty  -4.7  +0.8  -3.9 
Notes: Incomes measured before housing costs have been deducted. Great Britain only. Figures may not sum due to rounding. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Family Resources Surveys 1998–99, 2004–05 and 2008–09. 23 
 
Table 4.7. Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of changes in child poverty between 1998–99 and 2008–09 (Great Britain), controlling 
for family type and work status, number of children, age of youngest child, parental age, housing tenure and region. 
  1998–99 to 2004–05  2004–05 to 2008–09  1998–99 to 2008–09 


















Family type  and 
work status  -0.7  0.6  0.0  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  -0.9  0.3  -0.1 
Number of 
children  -0.2  0.0  -0.2  -0.2  0.0  0.0  -0.4  0.3  -0.6 
Age of youngest 
child  0.0  -0.2  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.1  -0.2  -0.1 
Parental age  0.0  2.1  0.0  0.1  -1.5  -0.1  0.2  0.5  -0.1 
Housing tenure  -0.2  -0.9  -0.1  -0.2  -2.0  0.0  -0.5  -2.7  -0.1 
Region  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  -0.1  0.3  -0.1 
Total  -1.1  +1.8  -0.3  -0.5  -3.7  -0.4  -1.5  -1.6  -1.1 
‘Secular’ trend  -5.1  +5.3  +0.3 
Change in child 
poverty  -4.7  +0.8  -3.9 
Notes: Incomes measured before housing costs have been deducted. Great Britain only. Figures may not sum due to rounding. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Family Resources Surveys 1998–99, 2004–05 and 2008–09. 5.  Child poverty and direct taxes and benefits since 1998–99 
We now turn our attention to the direct tax and benefit system, a key driver of 
trends in child poverty since 1998–99. We first provide an overview of changes 
to benefit entitlements for example families over this period, and then explicitly 
simulate the direct impact of reforms to the direct tax and benefit system since 
1998–99 on the child poverty rate in 2010–11. 
The evolution of benefit and tax credit entitlements since 1998–99 
State  benefits  and  tax  credits  comprise  the  majority  of  the  net  household 
incomes  of  individuals  in  the  second  and  third  decile  groups  of  the  income 
distribution  (approximately  those  around  the  poverty  line).  Changes  in 
entitlements to state benefits and tax credits are therefore likely to be a key 
determinant of what happens to relative poverty. Here we track changes to these 
entitlements since 1998–99 for some key family types likely to be in or close to 
poverty (we  include  families  without  children, to  put changes  into a  broader 
perspective). 
Table  5.1  shows  year-on-year  growth  rates  in  nominal  entitlements  to  social 
security benefits and tax credits and compares these with year-on-year nominal 
changes in the poverty line and in prices. Numbers in bold mark instances where 
entitlements to benefits grew faster than prices (as measured by RPI and ROSSI). 
Shaded  cells  mark  instances  where  entitlements  grew  faster  than  the  BHC 
poverty  line;  considered  in  isolation,  this  would  suggest  a  declining  relative 
poverty rate for that family type in that year.22 
Table 5.1 shows the following: 
  Families with children and pensioners have experienced by far the most 
generous increases in benefit and tax credit entitlements since 1998–99 
(note that these are also the groups who have driven the reductions in 
overall poverty over the same period).  
  The generosity of growth in entitlements for families with children tailed 
off between 2004–5 and 2007–08. 
  Since 1998–99, the years in which benefit and tax credit entitlements for 
families with children rose in real terms and relative to the BHC poverty 
line coincide almost perfectly with the years in which child poverty fell.23  
                                                      
22 Some of these benefits are designed only to cover non-housing costs, and so it might 
be more appropriate to compare them with changes in the ROSSI index or growth in 
the AHC poverty line. For example, growth in the rate of JSA for a single adult has 
exceeded the change in RPI in only two years, but it has exceeded the change in ROSSI 
in seven years. 
23 1998–99 is the unsurprising exception: the reduction in entitlements for lone parents 
in that year is entirely due to the abolition of one parent benefit, which only affected 
new claimants of child benefit and income support and therefore had a very small 
impact on child poverty. Living Standards 
25 
 
These  observations  provide  motivation  for  the  next  subsection,  where  we 
explicitly analyse the link between the tax and benefit system and child poverty 
using micro-simulation techniques.  
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Table 5.1. Growth in nominal entitlements to state support for certain family types (%)  











































1998–99  2.4  –3.8  –5.5  2.4  3.6  3.6  2.4  2.4  3.8  4.3  3.1  2.2  -0.9 
1999–00  9.3  8.6  9.3  2.1  3.2  3.2  6.5  6.5  5.0  5.5  1.6  1.7  -0.4 
2000–01  13.4  8.8  18.1  1.6  1.1  1.1  4.6  4.6  5.9  5.8  3.0  1.4  -2.3 
2001–02  9.1  6.4  7.2  1.6  3.3  7.4  17.5  15.3  6.3  7.5  1.5  1.7  -0.2 
2002–03  4.1  3.2  4.2  1.7  1.7  4.1  6.5  6.6  3.7  4.8  2.1  1.5  -0.5 
2003–04  8.6  6.6  7.4  1.3  1.7  2.6  4.3  4.0  2.4  2.4  2.8  1.7  -0.5 
2004–05  6.0  4.6  5.0  1.8  2.8  2.8  3.0  3.3  4.0  2.6  3.1  1.3  -0.8 
2005–06  2.5  2.0  3.1  1.0  3.1  3.1  3.8  3.8  3.5  3.2  2.6  1.9  +0.7 
2006–07  3.1  2.7  3.0  2.2  2.7  2.7  4.2  4.2  4.1  3.7  3.7  3.1  +0.4 
2007–08  3.7  3.3  3.7  3.0  3.6  3.6  4.4  4.4  4.3  3.4  4.1  2.8  +0.2 
2008–09  6.9  5.4  6.2  2.3  3.9  3.9  4.2  4.2  3.6  3.4  3.0  4.5  -0.7 
2009–10  6.3  6.1  5.5  6.3  6.4  5.0  4.8  4.8  -  -  0.5  2.7  - 
2010–11  2.2  2.0  1.9  1.8  1.7  2.5  2.0  2.0  -  -  -  -  - 
Notes: The table shows annual changes in maximum entitlements to benefits for various family types with no private income (except the working lone parent, 
who is assumed to earn an amount that is below the personal income tax allowance and the primary threshold for National Insurance contributions) ignoring 
housing benefit and council tax benefit and the value of free school meals for families with children. ‘RPI’ measures the change in the annual average of the RPI all 
items index since the previous year; ‘Rossi’ measures the change in the annual average of the Rossi since the previous year. Values in bold are greater than the 
change in the RPI over the same period; shaded cells are greater than the change in both the BHC and AHC poverty lines.  
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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The direct impact of tax and benefit reforms since 1998–99 on child poverty 
in 2010–11 
In this section we present projections of the number of children in poverty in 
2010–11. Each projection assumes a different direct tax and benefit system in 
2010–11. The first is the actual 2010–11 system, as it currently exists. The others 
are the 2010–11 system as it would be if the government had made no direct tax 
and benefit reforms since 1998–99, 2004–05 and 2007–08 respectively, using 
different definitions of what counts as a “reform”24.  
The  projections  make  use  of  the  IFS  tax  and  benefit  static  micro-simulation 
model, TAXBEN. The methods used are identical to those in Brewer, Browne, 
Joyce and Sutherland (2009). The projection under the ‘actual 2010–11 system’ 
thus represents an update of the ‘current policies’ projection in that previous 
work. It is an update in the following respects: we take account of reforms to the 
direct tax and benefit system in 2010–11 that have since been announced; we 
use updated assumptions about the take-up rates for means-tested benefits and 
tax  credits,  employment,  earnings  and  other  financial  variables  that  affect 
household incomes; we update demographic projections such as the number of 
lone parents; and we use more recent ‘base’ data on household incomes  from 
which to project forward to 2010–11 (we use data from 2007–08 and 2008–09, 
the latest available, rather than 2005–06 and 2006–07 as last time).  
Note that this technique does not account for any behavioural responses to tax 
and benefit reforms,  such as  labour supply  or fertility changes. Thus, we  are 
quantifying the direct impact of those reforms on child poverty. At the end of 
Section 5 we investigate the impact of tax and benefit reforms since 1998–99 on 
financial work incentives for parents, and in Section 6 we track labour market 
trends for parents since 1998–99. 
First, Figure 5.1 presents actual child poverty as measured by the HBAI series 
between 1998–99 and 2008–09, the target level in 2010–11, and our projection 
of child poverty in 2010–11 under the actual tax and benefit system in that year 
(i.e. the current  system). It  shows that, under our projection, there  will be  1 
million fewer children in poverty in 2010–11 than in 1998–99. This corresponds 
to  a  projected  child  poverty  rate  in  2010–11  of  18.4%,  which  would  be  the 
lowest such rate since 1984. However, the 2010–11 target is still highly likely to 
be  missed  by  a  substantial  margin  –  about  700,000  children  under  our 
projection. This is similar to the projection of relative child poverty in 2010–11 
produced by the previous Government earlier this year using similar methods25. 
                                                      
24 In Appendix 2 we present projections of both BHC and AHC child poverty under the scenario 
of no reform since a particular year for every year between 1998–99 and 2009–10. Here we just 
focus on BHC incomes and the three ‘no reform’ scenarios indicated in the text. 
25 See HM Treasury, Department for Children, Schools and Families and Department for Work 
and Pensions (2010).  
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Figure 5.1. Actual and projected relative (BHC) income child poverty in the 
UK between 1998–99 and 2010–11 
 
Notes: Years refer to financial years. For the purposes of the child poverty target in 2010–11, 
the DWP has had to estimate the level of relative child poverty in the UK in 1998–99 (Northern 
Ireland was first included in the official HBAI series in 2002–03). 
Sources: Family Resources Survey, various years; authors’ calculations using TAXBEN and 
assumptions specified in the text. 
We can also simulate what child poverty would be if the 2010–11 tax and benefit 
system were different. Specifically, we can attempt to isolate the direct impact on 
child poverty in 2010–11 of tax and benefit reforms since a particular year, by 
simulating what child poverty would be if the direct tax and benefit system of 
that year had been left unreformed. We define ‘no direct tax and benefit reforms’ 
in two alternative ways26: 
1.  1998–99 default uprating: the parameters of the direct tax and benefit 
system are uprated in the way that was default in 1998–99. This involves 
uprating most means-tested benefits in line with the Rossi27, and other 
benefits and tax thresholds in line with the RPI. 
2.  GDP uprating: the parameters of the direct tax and benefit system are 
uprated in line with nominal GDP. 
Table 5.2 presents the results of these simulations. The first three rows show our 
estimate  of  what  child  poverty  would  be  in  2010–11  if  the  government  had 
implemented  no  direct  tax  and  benefit  reforms  since  1998–99,  2004–05  and 
                                                      
26 There are a number of counterfactual ‘no-reform’ scenarios that one could reasonably use.  
For a discussion of various alternatives see Adam and Browne (forthcoming). 
27 Tax credits, which did not exist in 1998–99, are uprated in line with the Rossi index for this 
counterfactual, on the basis that their forebears – family credit and child additions in income 
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2007–08 respectively (for each of the two definitions of ‘no reform’ given above). 
The bottom row simply restates our projection of 2010–11 child poverty under 
the  actual 2010–11 tax and benefit system, as  presented in Figure  5.1. Thus, 
comparing the top and bottom rows reveals the estimated direct impact on child 
poverty in 2010–11 of direct tax and benefit reforms since 1998–99. Specifically, 
child poverty in 2010–11 is estimated to be between 1.3 million and 1.9 million 
lower than it would be if the tax and benefit system had not been reformed since 
1998–99, depending on the definition of ‘no reform’ that we use. However, the 
second row reveals that the majority of this child-poverty reducing impact is due 
to those reforms implemented between 1998–99 and 2004–05. The similarity 
between  the  numbers  in  the  second  and  third  rows  shows  that  reforms 
implemented between 2004–05 and 2007–08 did little or nothing to reduce child 
poverty: in fact, compared to a GDP-uprating baseline, reforms over this period 
increased child poverty in 2010–11 by more than 1 percentage point. 
However we define a ‘reform’, there is thus a striking correlation between trends 
in child poverty since 1998–99 and the direct impact of tax and benefit reforms 
on child poverty over that period. The years in which child poverty rose (2005–
06, 2006–07 and 2007–08) stand out as years in which tax and benefit reforms 
were much less child poverty-reducing, or even child poverty-increasing when 
compared to the GDP-uprating baseline. This is very suggestive evidence that the 
tax and benefit system has been a key driver of both: i) the substantial overall 
reduction  in  child  poverty  since  1998–99  and  ii)  the  slowdown  in  progress 
towards the child poverty targets between 2004–05 and 2007–08. 
See Appendix 2 for estimates of the impact of reforms since every year between 
1998–99 and 2009–10, and for the corresponding numbers for AHC incomes. 
Table 5.2. Simulations of relative (BHC) income child poverty in the UK in 
2010–11 under various direct tax and benefit systems  
Direct tax and benefit 
system in 2010–11  Simulated child poverty in 2010–11 
  1998–99 default 
uprating 
GDP uprating 
  %  Million  %  Million 
1998–99 uprated  32.1  4.3  27.7  3.7 
2004–05 uprated  22.0  2.9  18.3  2.4 
2007–08 uprated  21.4  2.8  19.6  2.6 
Actual 2010–11 system  18.4  2.4  18.4  2.4 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Family Resources Survey 2007–08 and 2008–09 using 
TAXBEN and assumptions specified in the text.  
Table 5.2 also suggests that factors other than the direct impact of tax and benefit 
reforms have acted to increase child poverty since 1998–99. For example, using 
the ‘1998–99 default uprating’ definition of ‘no reform’, our results suggest that 
in the absence of tax and benefit reforms child poverty would have risen from its  
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1998–99  level  of  3.4  million  to  a  2010–11  level  of  4.3  million.  Thus,  other 
changes have acted to increase child poverty by 900,000 over that period (or 
300,000 against the ‘GDP-uprating’ definition of ‘no reform’). This is confirmed 
by repeating the simulations shown in Table 5.2, but for a 1998–99 population 
with 2010–11 levels of earnings (and other financial variables). Table 5.3 shows 
the  results  of  these  simulations,  and  compares  them  with  the  corresponding 
results for a 2010–11 population that were shown in Table 5.2. We show only 
child poverty rates, because the size of the child population has changed over 
time, and we restrict our analysis to Great Britain because Northern Ireland was 
not included in the Family Resources Survey in 1998–99. 
Table 5.3. Simulations of relative (BHC) income child poverty in Great 
Britain in 2010–11 under the actual 2010–11 tax and benefit system and an 
unreformed 1998–99 system, for the 1998–99 population and the 2010–11 
population.  
Direct tax and benefit system in 
2010–11 
Simulated child poverty rate (%) in Great 
Britain in 2010–11  
  1998–99 population  2010–11 population 
1998–99 default-uprated  29.9  32.1 
1998–99 GDP-uprated  22.3  27.7 
Actual 2010–11 system  14.6  18.4 
Memo: Actual 1998–99 rate  26.0  26.0 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Family Resources Survey 1998–99, 2007–08 and 2008–
09 using TAXBEN and assumptions specified in the text.  
 Table 5.3 highlights three important points: 
  Under  each  direct  tax  and  benefit  system,  simulated  child  poverty  in 
2010–11 is lower amongst a 1998–99 population (with 2010–11 earnings 
levels) than amongst the 2010–11 population. Thus, population changes 
have acted to increase child poverty between 1998–99 and 2010–11.  
 
  The  direct  impact  of  tax  and  benefit  reforms  over  the  period  differs 
slightly  when  we  simulate  using  the  ‘base-year’  (1998–99)  population 
rather than the ‘end-year’ (2010–11) population. For example, under the 
‘GDP-uprating’  definition  of  ‘no  reform’,  the  impact  of  reforms  since 
1998–99 seems to be to reduce child poverty by 8 percentage points and 
9  percentage  points  for  the  1998–99  and  2010–11  populations 
respectively.  It  is  not  surprising  that  there  is  a  difference.  Since  tax 
liabilities and benefit or tax credit entitlements depend on individual or 
family characteristics, changes in the distribution of those characteristics 
in the population will change the impact of given tax or benefit reforms.  
 
  Growth  in  financial  variables  (most  importantly  earnings)  has  been 
important over the period. For example, child poverty would have risen 
from its 1998–99 level of 26.1% to a 2010–11 level of 30.0% if 1998–99  
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default tax and benefit uprating procedures had been maintained and the 
population  had  remained  the  same.  Earnings  growth  tends  to  drive 
income growth at the median, and thus (other things being equal) tends 
to increase a relative income measure of poverty against a baseline where 
benefit rates are uprated more slowly than earnings.  
These observations motivate a manipulation of the numbers in Table 5.3 in order 
to separate the impact on child poverty in 2010–11 of three factors: the direct 
effects of tax and benefit reforms since 1998–99; population change since 1998–
99; and growth in financial variables (notably earnings) since 1998–99. We do 
this  with  a  Shapley-Shorrocks28  decomposition.  Appendix  3  gives  tech nical 
details of this technique, and Table 5.4 shows the results of the decomposition.  
Table 5.4. Shapley-Shorrocks decomposition of the change in relative (BHC) 
income child poverty between 1998–99 and 2010–11 (Great Britain). 
Factor affecting child poverty 
since 1998–99  Impact on child poverty in 2010–11 (ppts)  
  ‘No reform’ = ‘1998–
99 default uprating’ 
‘No reform’ = ‘GDP-
uprating’ 
Direct tax and benefit reforms  -14.5  -8.6 
Population change  +3.0  +4.5 
Growth in financial variables  +3.9  -3.7 
Total change in child poverty  -7.6  -7.6 
Notes: Figures may not sum due to rounding. The effect of ‘direct tax and benefit reforms’ is 
the direct effect assuming no behavioural responses to those reforms. Any indirect effects 
through labour supply or fertility responses would be picked up by the effect of ‘population 
change’. ‘Growth in financial variables’ includes growth in earnings and other sources of private 
income as well as rents (which affect housing benefit entitlements). The effect of earnings 
growth is likely to be very important, as earnings is the dominant source of income for the 
median household and it therefore affects the relative poverty line. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Family Resources Survey 1998–99, 2007–08 and 2008–
09 using TAXBEN and assumptions specified in the text.  
Table 5.4 shows the following: 
  As  we  saw  in  Tables 5.2  and  5.3,  the  direct  impact  of  tax  and  benefit 
reforms between 1998–99 and 2010–11 has been to reduce child poverty 
substantially. 
 
  Population change over the period has acted to increase child poverty. 
 
  Earnings growth has acted to increase child poverty when we define ‘no 
tax and benefit reforms’ as ‘1998–99 default uprating’. This is because the 
default uprating procedure in 1998–99 was to index benefits to the Retail 
                                                      
28 See Shorrocks (1999).  
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Price  Index  or  the  Rossi  index,  both  of  which  grew  less  quickly  than 
earnings  between  1998–99  and  2010–11.  Hence,  median  income  (and 
hence the poverty line) grew faster than benefit rates under this scenario, 
increasing relative poverty. 
 
  Conversely,  using  analagous  reasoning,  earnings  growth  has  acted  to 
reduce child poverty when we define ‘no tax and benefit reforms’ as ‘GDP 
uprating’, because GDP grew more quickly than earnings over the period. 
The  child-poverty  increasing  effect  of  population  change  implies  that  the 
composition  of  the  population  has  shifted  in  one  of  two  ways  (or  some 
combination of the two). First, changes in the characteristics of the population 
may have increased the median income (for example, increases in employment 
over  the  decade),  thereby  increasing  the  relative  poverty  line  and  increasing 
child poverty.  Second, groups of children at higher risk of poverty could have 
become relatively more common (for example, increase in the relative number of 
lone parents). Note that such changes could include indirect effects of tax and 
benefit  reforms.  For  example,  those  reforms  could  have  induced  behavioural 
responses which have changed the average characteristics of people who have 
children or the labour supply of parents. With the latter possibility in mind, at 
the end of Section 5 we investigate the impact of tax and benefit reforms since 
1998–99  on  financial  work  incentives  for  parents,  and  in Section 6  we  track 
labour market trends for parents since 1998–99. 
Our  results  in  Table  5.4  are  consistent  with  work  by  Dickens  (forthcoming). 
Looking at the period between 1997–98 and 2007–08, he also finds that tax and 
benefit reforms were by far the largest driver of the reduction in child poverty 
over the period (this was mostly due to benefit reforms); but that demographic 
changes (including increases in the number of lone parents) and earnings growth 
acted to increase child poverty. 
Subgroup analysis of the direct impact of tax and benefit reforms since 1998–
99 on child poverty in 2010–11 
It is interesting to consider whether the differential impact of tax and benefit 
reforms since 1998–99 on different groups of children can explain differential 
trends  in  poverty  rates  between  those  groups.  In  Section  4  we  noted  the 
following points: 
1.  Families with younger children have seen much larger reductions in their 
risk  of  poverty  between  1998–99  and  2008–09  than  those  with  older 
children. 29 
                                                      
29 Precisely, children living in families where the youngest child is younger have 
experienced the faster reductions in poverty rates. It makes sense to group children in 
this way (rather than by their individual ages) because we are dealing with a 
household-level measure of income.  
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2.  Children  in  large  families  have  seen  the  largest  reductions  in  poverty 
rates between 1998–99 and 2008–09; children in 1-child families have 
experienced a small increase in the risk of poverty over this period. 
3.  Children of lone parents experienced the largest reduction in the risk of 
poverty between 1998–99 and 2008–09; and the increase in child poverty 
between 2004–05 and 2008–09 was driven by an increase in the poverty 
risk for children of couples. 
Here, we examine more closely the results of the simulations shown in Table 5.2 
to  see  whether  tax  and  benefit  policy  can  explain  any  of  these  subgroup 
differences. Because the decompositions in Section 4 were based on changes in 
child  poverty  between  1998–99  and  2008–09  (the  latest  year  of  household 
income data), here we include simulations of child poverty in 2010–11 under an 
unreformed 2008–09 tax and benefit system, in order to isolate the direct impact 
of reforms up to that year. 
There are reasons to expect that the faster reduction in poverty risk for families 
with younger children since 1998–99 might be (at least partly) driven by tax and 
benefit reforms.  This is because: 
  Tax credit entitlements were gradually equalised for parents of children 
of  all  ages  over  12  months  (previously  the  Family  Credit,  which  was 
replaced by the Working Families Tax Credit in 1999–00, had been tiered 
so that parents of older children received significantly more).  
  Families  with a  child  under 12 months  have (subject to  income) been 
entitled to an additional £545 per year in tax credits since 2003–04.  
This  motivates  the  analysis  presented  in  Table  5.5,  where  we  repeat  the 
simulations shown in Table 5.2 for different groups of children (also including 
simulations under an unreformed 2008–09 tax and benefit system), separated by 
the age of the youngest child in their family. It shows the following: 
  Between 1998–99 and 2008–09, tax and benefit reforms did indeed do 
more to reduce the poverty risk in families with younger children. For 
example,  taking  ‘1998–99  default  uprating’  to  mean  ‘no  reforms’,  we 
estimate that reforms over this period reduced the poverty risk by 47%, 
38% and 27% for children in families where the youngest child is under 5, 
between 5 and 10, and over 10 respectively30. Thus, there is evidence that 
reforms have contributed to the convergence of poverty risks amongst 
families with children of different ages. 
                                                      
30 These percentage reductions in poverty risk correspond to the percentage point 
reductions of 17.9, 11.5 and 6.8 that are implied by Table 5.5. It is more informative, 
for these purposes, to convert percentage point reductions into percentage reductions. 
For example, say that one group starts with a poverty risk of 50%, and another starts 
with a poverty risk of 10%. If reforms over a particular period halve the risk of poverty 
for all groups, the percentage point reduction in poverty would be far larger for the 
first group (25 rather than 5), but the percentage reduction - 50% - would be the same 
for both.  
34 
 
  However, the results in Table 5.5 do not explain why the risk of poverty in 
families whose youngest child is over 10 has increased between 1998–99 
and 2008–09 (see Table 4.4): under either definition of ‘no reform’, tax 
and  benefit  reforms  have  acted  to  reduce  child  poverty  amongst  this 
group. 
Tax  and  benefit  reforms  could  also  help  to  explain  why  families  with  more 
children have been such large statistical drivers of the overall reduction in child 
poverty since 1998–99. Increases in the generosity of per-child payments, which 
have been implemented over the last decade largely through the child elements 
of the Working Families Tax Credit (between 1999–00 and 2003–04) and the 
Child  Tax  Credit  (from  2003–04  onwards),  are  a  potential  explanation.  To 
investigate this, Table 5.6 splits children up by the number of children in their 
family. The Table shows: 
  Between  1998–99  and  2008–09,  taking  ‘1998–99  default  uprating’  to 
mean ‘no reforms’,  tax and benefit reforms reduced the risk of poverty 
by 29%, 43% and 43% for children in 1-child families, 2-child families 
and families with 3 or more children respectively. 
  Hence,  those  reforms  seem  to  have  contributed  to  the  fact  that  the 
relative performance (in terms of child poverty trends) of 1-child families 
over the period has been worse than that of other families with children. 
  However, the explanatory power of tax and benefit reforms is limited 
here in at least two respects: they do not explain why the poverty risk 
amongst  children  in  1-child  families  increased  between  1998–99  and 
2008–09  (reforms  were  in  fact  poverty-reducing  amongst  these 
children); and they do not explain why families with 3 or more children 
have seen such a large reduction in poverty risk relative to those with 2 
children. 
Family tax credit entitlements are not dependent upon the number of adults in 
the family, so with an equivalised income measure we might also expect lone 
parents to have benefited more from tax and benefit reforms since 1998–99 than 
parents in couples. Table 5.7 splits children up according to whether they live 
with a lone parent or couple parents. It shows: 
  Taking ‘1998–99 default uprating’ to mean ‘no reforms’, we estimate that 
the direct impact of tax and benefit reforms between 1998–99 and 2008–
09 has been to reduce child poverty in lone parent families by 48% and in 
couple families by 33%. Thus, the fact that child poverty has fallen much 
more in lone parent families than couple families may be partly due to the 
direct impact of tax and benefit reforms31. 
                                                      
31 Other likely explanations include the large rise in lone parent employment over the 
period, as shown in Table 4.2, and the relatively weak performance of the earnings of 
one-earner couples in recent years (see Section 6). The rise in lone parent employment 
could be (at least partly) a consequence of tax and benefit reforms since 1998–99, 
which have tended to increase the incentive for lone parents to be in work (see next 
subsection).   
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  Tax  and  benefit  reforms  do  not  help  to  explain  why  the  rise  in  child 
poverty  between  2004–05  and  2008–09  was  due  to  a  rise  in  poverty 
amongst the children of couples. Under either definition of ‘no reforms’, 
the direct impact of tax and benefit reforms on the children of couples 
between 2004–05 and 2008–09 was slightly poverty-reducing. In Section 
6, where we look at labour market trends amongst parents, we suggest a 
different explanation. 
Table 5.5. Simulations of relative child poverty in the UK in 2010–11 under 
various direct tax and benefit systems, by age of youngest child in the family  
Direct tax and benefit 
system in 2010–11  Simulated child poverty in 2010–11 (BHC) 
  1998–99 default 
uprating 
GDP uprating 
  %  Million  %  Million 
   
  Youngest child in family under 5 
         
1998–99 uprated  37.8  2.2  34.2  2.0 
2004–05 uprated  23.0  1.3  18.4  1.1 
2007–08 uprated  22.1  1.3  20.1  1.2 
2008–09 uprated  19.9  1.2  18.4  1.2 
Actual 2010–11 system  18.0  1.1  18.0  1.1 
   
  Youngest child in family 5 to 10 
         
1998–99 uprated  30.6  1.2  26.1  1.0 
2004–05 uprated  21.4  0.9  18.0  0.7 
2007–08 uprated  21.0  0.8  19.6  0.8 
2008–09 uprated  19.1  0.8  17.8  0.7 
Actual 2010–11 system  17.8  0.7  17.8  0.7 
   
  Youngest child in family 11+ 
   
1998–99 uprated  25.3  0.9  19.7  0.7 
2004–05 uprated  19.9  0.7  18.1  0.6 
2007–08 uprated  19.5  0.7  19.0  0.7 
2008–09 uprated  18.5  0.7  18.3  0.6 
Actual 2010–11 system  17.7  0.6  17.7  0.6 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Family Resources Survey 2007–08 and 2008–09 using 
TAXBEN and assumptions specified in the text.   
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Table 5.6. Simulations of relative child poverty in the UK in 2010–11 
under various direct tax and benefit systems, by number of children in 
the family  
Direct tax and benefit 
system in 2010–11  Simulated child poverty in 2010–11 (BHC) 
  1998–99 default 
uprating 
GDP uprating 
  %  Million  %  Million 
   
  1 child in the family 
         
1998–99 uprated  22.2  0.8  17.5  0.6 
2004–05 uprated  16.7  0.6  14.4  0.5 
2007–08 uprated  16.5  0.6  15.5  0.5 
2008–09 uprated  15.8  0.5  15.2  0.5 
Actual 2010–11 system  15.1  0.5  15.1  0.5 
   
  2 children in the family 
         
1998–99 uprated  26.5  1.6  23.0  1.3 
2004–05 uprated  17.1  1.0  14.6  0.9 
2007–08 uprated  16.4  1.0  15.8  0.9 
2008–09 uprated  15.2  0.9  14.5  0.9 
Actual 2010–11 system  14.3  0.8  14.3  0.8 
   
  3 or more children in the family 
   
1998–99 uprated  49.4  2.0  44.1  1.8 
2004–05 uprated  32.6  1.3  26.7  1.1 
2007–08 uprated  31.9  1.3  28.8  1.2 
2008–09 uprated  28.2  1.1  26.0  1.0 
Actual 2010–11 system  25.5  1.0  25.5  1.0 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Family Resources Survey 2007–08 and 2008–09 




Table 5.7. Simulations of relative child poverty in the UK in 2010–11 under 
various direct tax and benefit systems, by family type  
Direct tax and benefit 
system in 2010–11  Simulated child poverty in 2010–11 (BHC) 
  1998–99 default 
uprating 
GDP uprating 
  %  Million  %  Million 
   
  Lone parent families 
         
1998–99 uprated  53.8  1.8  39.2  1.3 
2004–05 uprated  32.7  1.1  24.7  0.8 
2007–08 uprated  31.0  1.0  26.8  0.9 
2008–09 uprated  28.1  0.9  25.3  0.8 
Actual 2010–11 system  26.1  0.9  26.1  0.9 
   
  Couple families 
   
1998–99 uprated  25.1  2.5  24.2  2.4 
2004–05 uprated  18.0  1.8  16.0  1.6 
2007–08 uprated  17.8  1.8  17.2  1.7 
2008–09 uprated  16.3  1.6  15.8  1.6 
Actual 2010–11 system  15.1  1.5  15.1  1.5 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Family Resources Survey 2007–08 and 2008–09 using 
TAXBEN and assumptions specified in the text.  
 
The effect of direct tax and benefit reforms since 1998–99 on financial work 
incentives for parents 
Here we draw on work by IFS researchers (Adam and Browne, forthcoming) to 
document how reforms since 1998–99 have affected financial work incentives 
for parents. There are two ways that taxes and benefits can affect financial work 
incentives: they can affect the incentive to be in work; and they can affect the 
incentive for existing workers to earn a little more. We consider each in turn 
here. 
First, we consider the financial incentive to be in work. A measure of the impact 
of taxes and benefits on this incentive is the participation tax rate (PTR): this 
measures the proportion of (gross) earnings lost in direct taxes or forgone state 
benefit  and  tax  credit  entitlements  when  someone  moves  into  work.  Hence, 
lower PTRs signal stronger financial incentives to be in work. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 
show what the mean PTRs for parents would be if the direct tax and benefit  
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system had not been reformed since particular years, for each year since 1998–
99, and for each  definition  of ‘no reform’ that we  have  used throughout  this 
section. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show that tax and benefit reforms since 1998–99 
have tended to: 
  strengthen the incentive for lone parents to be in work (this is primarily 
due to the introduction of the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC), which 
was subsequently integrated into the Working Tax Credit and Child Tax 
Credit, in October 1999); 
  weaken the incentive for parents with a working partner to be in work 
(again,  this  is  primarily  due  to  the  introduction  of  WFTC  and  the 
subsequent expansion of means-testing at the family level, which reduces 
the  incentive  for  potential  second  earners  to  work  because  doing  so 
would result in lost tax credit entitlement as family income rises); 
  and  slightly  weaken  financial  incentives  to  be  in  work  for  parents  in 
couples where the partner does not work. 
Second,  we  consider  the  financial  incentive  for  parents  already  in  work  to 
increase their earnings. A measure of this incentive is the marginal effective tax 
rate (METR). The METR measures the proportion of a small increase in gross 
earnings lost to additional tax payments and forgone state benefit and tax credit 
entitlements. A lower METR therefore signals a stronger financial incentive to 
increase  earnings  slightly  (this  could  be  through  working  more  hours, 
promotion, qualifying for bonus payments or getting a better-paid job). Figures 
5.4 and 5.5 show what the mean METRs for working parents would be if the tax 
and benefit system had not been reformed since particular years, for each year 
since  1998–99,  and  for  each  definition  of  ‘no  reform’  that  we  have  used 
throughout this section. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 show that: 
  tax  and  benefit  reforms  since  1998–99  have  tended  to  weaken  the 
incentive for working parents to slightly increase their earnings; 
  and this is more the case for parents in couples than for lone parents. 
The impact of tax and benefit reforms on the labour supply of parents depends 
not only on the impact on financial work incentives, but also on the degree to 
which the labour supply decisions of the affected parents are responsive to those 
incentives.  These  levels  of  responsiveness  differ  for  different  groups.  For 
example, empirical evidence suggests that the decision of whether or not to work 
is particularly responsive to financial incentives for lone parents; on the other 
hand,  married  men  (typically  the  first  potential  earners  in  couples)  are  very 
unresponsive  to  changes  in  the  financial  incentive  to  earn  a  little  more32. 
Although lone parents are the only group of parents (of those we look at) for 
whom tax and benefit reforms since 1998–99 have strengthened work incentives 
(as measured by PTRs), this group is particularly responsive to those incentives 
and particularly like to be in poverty. Hence, the net effect on child poverty of 
                                                      
32 Meghir and Phillips (2010).  
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parents’ labour supply responses to tax and benefit reforms since 1998–99 is not 
clear. 
Note also that the impacts on financial work incentives for parents of tax and 
benefit  reforms  since  2004–05  have  been  negligible.  Hence,  labour  supply 
responses to tax and benefit reforms do not seem to have a role in explaining 
what has happened since the ‘turning point’ for child poverty in that year. 
    
40 
 
Figure 5.2. The effect of tax and benefit reforms since 1998–99 on financial 
incentives for parents to be in work (‘no reform’ = ‘1998–99 default 
uprating’).  
  
Source: Adam and Browne (forthcoming). 
Figure 5.3. The effect of tax and benefit reforms since 1998–99 on financial 
incentives for parents to be in work (‘no reform’ = ‘GDP-uprating’).  
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Figure 5.4. The effect of tax and benefit reforms since 1998–99 on financial 
incentives for working parents to increase their earnings (‘no reform’ = 
‘1998–99 default uprating’). 
  
Source: Adam and Browne (forthcoming). 
Figure 5.5. The effect of tax and benefit reforms since 1998–99 on financial 
incentives for working parents to increase their earnings (‘no reform’ = 
‘GDP-uprating’). 
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6.  Parents and the labour market 
Earnings  from  employment  are  the  single  largest  source  of  income  for 
households in the UK. Labour market trends are thus likely to be a significant 
determinant of the evolution of poverty amongst families with children. In this 
section,  we  examine  labour  market  trends  amongst  parents.  We  seek  to 
document such trends and ask whether they can be used to explain the fall in 
poverty between 1998–99 and 2004–05, as well as the subsequent rise since 
2004–05. We look at parents in general (comparing them with other working-
age  adults)  and  then  focus  on  different  sub-groups,  relating  this  back  to  the 
previous decomposition analysis in order to see whether labour market trends 
can be used to explain differential trends in poverty amongst specific groups.  
It should be noted that this analysis uses a different survey to that used in the 
rest of this briefing note. We use the quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS) from 
April-June  1998  onwards,  creating  financial  year  data  by  combining  datasets 
across quarters within financial years. This is because the LFS contains more 
detailed and reliable information on individual adult earnings, employment and 
wage rates.  
Analysis is conducted at an individual level (as opposed to a household level in 
previous sections). We focus solely on working-age adults, separating them out 
into  parents  (those  with  dependent  children  aged  under  19)  and  all  other 
working-age  adults.  All  data  is  weighed  using  the  appropriate  LFS  weights 
(either the general or income weight depending on the focus of analysis). All 
earnings data related to individuals gross adult earnings and is unequivalised, 
and all monetary values are presented in 2008–09 prices.  
General labour market trends  
This  section  looks  at  general  labour  market  trends  for  parents  as  a  whole, 
comparing these with those seen for other working-age adults.  
Figure 6.1 shows the employment rates of parents and other working-age adults 
between 1998–99 and 2009–10. It shows that in parents and other working-age 
adults had very similar employment rates in 1998–99, just under 75%, with both 
seeing similar rises of around 1 percentage point up to 2003–04. After 2003–04, 
employment  rates  continued  to  increase  for  parents  for  two  further  years, 
reaching 77% in 2005–06. Employment rates then stagnated up to 2008–09. For 
all other working age-adults the stagnation started in 2003–04.      
As is well known, employment was then lower across the board in 2009–10 as a 
result of sustained falls in employment during the recent recession. Parents saw 
a fall of 1.2 percentage points compared with 2008–09, whilst other working-age 
adults saw a fall of over 2 percentage points. The employment prospects of other 
working-age  adults  deteriorated  far  worse  than  those  of  parents  during  the 
recent recession.   
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Figure 6.1 Employment rates for parents and other working-age adults 
 
Notes: Years refer to financial years and are for the UK as a whole.  
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Labour Force Survey (April-June 1998 onwards).  
Table  6.1  summarises  labour  market  trends  over  time  across  a  wider  set  of 
dimensions amongst parents and other working-age adults. Specifically, it shows 
the proportion in employment, proportion of those in employment working part-
time, mean average hours for those in work, median earnings for those in work, 
and median hourly pay for those in work.  These are shown for 1998–99 and 
2008–9, together with the change broken down into that which occurred from 
1998–99 to 2004–05 (the period when child poverty fell) and 2004–05 to 2008–
09 (the period when child poverty rose). We also show the levels in 2009–10 in 
order to indicate the changes that occurred during the recent recession. 
In 1998–99 about 28% of parents in work chose to work part-time (defined as 
less than 30 hours a week).  In doing so, they were more likely to work part-time 
than other working-age adults in employment, which is unsurprising given the 
need for parents to find childcare. The proportion of employed parents working 
part-time  changed  little  between  1998–99  and  2008–09,  and  has  only  risen 
slightly in 2009–10. However, the proportion of working-age adults who worked 
part-time rose between 1998–99 and 2004–05, fell slightly between 2004–05 
and 2008–09, before rising by over 1 percentage point in 2009–10.  
In  1998–99,  parents  worked  over  2  hours  less,  on  average,  than  did  other 
working-age  adults,  which  is  unsurprising  given  the  different  propensities  to 
work on a part-time basis. Both groups experienced a fall in their hours worked 
over the entire period, with the fall being greatest between 1998–99 and 2004–
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Table 6.1. Labour Market Trends for Parents and Other Working-Age Adults 
   Parents  Other 
Working-Age 
Adults 
Employment     
1998–99 (%)  74.7  74.8 
98–99 to 04–05 (ppt change)  +2.1  +1.3 
04–05 to 08–09 (ppt change)  +0.1  -0.4 
2008–09 (%)  76.9  75.7 
2009–10 (%)  75.7  73.9 
Proportion Working Part-time     
1998–99 (%)  28.0  16.7 
98–99 to 04–05 (ppt change)  +0.3  +0.8 
04–05 to 08–09 (ppt change)  -0.2  -0.2 
2008–09 (%)  28.1  17.3 
2009–10 (%)  28.7  18.6 
Hours     
1998–99 (mean hours)  35.1  37.5 
98–99 to 04–05  (change in hours)  -1.3  -1.2 
04–05 to 08–09  (change in hours)  -0.4  -0.1 
2008–09  (mean hours)  33.4  36.2 
2009–10  (mean hours)  33.2  35.7 
Earnings     
1998–99 (median, 2008-09 prices)  £344  £325 
98–99 to 04–05  (avg annual % change)  1.7%  2.1% 
04–05 to 08–09  (avg annual % change)  -0.5%  0.0% 
2008–09  (median, 2008-09 prices)  £375  £368 
2009–10  (median, 2008-09 prices)  £383  £368 
Hourly Pay     
1998–99 (median, 2008-09 prices)  £9.03  £8.12 
98–99 to 04–05  (avg annual % change)  2.6%  2.4% 
04–05 to 08–09  (avg annual % change)  -0.1%  0.1% 
2008–09  (median, 2008-09 prices)  £10.47  £9.40 
2009–10  (median, 2008-09 prices)  £10.86  £9.59 
Notes: Years refer to financial years. Figures are for the UK as a whole.  
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Labour Force Survey (April-June 1998 onwards).  
Individual median earnings were greater, on average, for parents than for other 
working-age adults in 1998–99. Parents then saw robust real-terms growth of 
1.7% on an average annualised basis between 1998-99 and 2004–05, below that 
of  other  working-age  adults  who  saw  average  growth  of  2.1%  per  year.  All 
working-age  adults  then  saw  a  slowdown  from  2004–05  onwards,  with  real-
terms  earnings  growth  for  parents  turning  negative  and  stagnating  for  other 
working-age adults.  Following on from the recent recession, parents in work  
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saw their earnings grow slightly in real-terms, whilst other working-age adults 
saw continued stagnation.  
Median hourly pay was slightly greater for parents than for other working-age 
adults in 1998–99. Both groups experienced a rise from 1998–99 to 2004–05, 
with that of parents being slightly greater than that seen for other working age 
adults. Growth in hourly pay then slowed down for both groups from 2004–05 
onwards, with parents seeing a small decline in hourly pay, whilst other working 
age adults saw their hourly wage  rise by a  small amount. It  thus seems that 
slower wage growth drove the slowdown in earnings from 2004–05 onwards. 
Real-terms wages grew for both groups in 2009–10.  
Analysis by sub-group 
In this section, we examine labour market trends amongst parents by various 
subgroups.  The  main  purpose  of  this  analysis  is  to  examine  whether  labour 
market  can  be  used  to  explain  changes  in  poverty  amongst  specific  groups 
between  1998–99  and 2008–09, as  well as the differential trends before  and 
after  2004–05.  Secondly,  we  are  also  able  to  examine  labour  market  trends 
amongst specific groups with a high risk of poverty.  
Table  6.2  shows  the  same  as  Table  6.1  except  that  we  now  focus  solely  on 
parents and we  now separate parents  into  lone parents, men in couples  and 
women in couples (due to the low number of male lone parents, we do not split 
lone parents by sex).  
As can be seen, lone parents had the lowest employment rates amongst these 
groups in 1998–99, with a majority out of work. However, over the next ten 
years, their employment rate grew by about 10 percentage points, such that the 
majority were in employment in 2008–09. The fastest rise in employment took 
place prior to 2004–05, with smaller growth in the latter period. This concurs 
with  analysis  presented  earlier  in  Table  4.2,  which  showed  reduced 
worklessness amongst lone parents playing an important role in reducing child 
poverty (particularly prior to 2004–05).  Men and women in couples also saw 
increases in employment between 1998–99 and 2004–05, but this was much 
more modest, though from much higher bases. Again we showed earlier that 
reduced worklessness amongst couples helped to reduce child poverty between 
1998–99 and 2004–05. Men and women in couples then saw relative stagnation 
in  employment  rates  up  to  2008–09.  All  three  groups  then  saw  falls  in 
employment  during  2009–10  following  on  from  the  recession,  with  men  in 
couples seeing the largest fall.  
Women and lone parents were much more likely to work part-time than men in 
couples throughout the period. Over the period, men in couples became slightly 
more likely to work part-time and women in couples slightly less likely to work 
part-time over the period. Earlier analysis suggests such shifts only had a minor 
impact on child poverty, if any.   
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Table 6.2. Labour Market Trends for Parents by Sex and Family Type 






Employment       
1998–99 (%)  45.8  89.7  68.8 
98–99 to 04–05 (ppt change)  +8.3  +1.3  +1.7 
04–05 to 08–09 (ppt change)  +1.7  -0.4  +0.4 
2008–09 (%)  55.8  90.6  70.9 
2009–10 (%)  54.7  88.9  70.3 
Proportion Working Part-time       
1998–99 (%)  49.5  5.1  55.2 
98–99 to 04–05 (ppt change)  -2.2  +1.2  -1.1 
04–05 to 08–09 (ppt change)  +0.9  +1.3  -3.0 
2008–09 (%)  48.2  7.6  51.1 
2009–10 (%)  48.5  8.2  51.2 
Hours       
1998–99 (mean hours)  26.8  44.2  25.0 
98–99 to 04–05  (change in hours)  +0.4  -2.0  -0.3 
04–05 to 08–09  (change in hours)  -0.4  -0.8  +0.4 
2008–09  (mean hours)  26.9  41.4  25.1 
2009–10  (mean hours)  26.8  41.0  25.0 
Earnings       
1998–99 (median, 2008-09 prices)  £182  £498  £195 
98–99 to 04–05  (avg annual % change)  4.8%  1.3%  3.7% 
04–05 to 08–09  (avg annual % change)  -1.0%  0.1%  0.9% 
2008–09  (median, 2008-09 prices)  £231  £538  £250 
2009–10  (median, 2008-09 prices)  £225  £539  £261 
Hourly Pay       
1998–99 (median, 2008-09 prices)  £6.58  £10.96  £7.30 
98–99 to 04–05  (avg annual % change)  4.3%  1.9%  3.4% 
04–05 to 08–09  (avg annual % change)  -1.5%  0.4%  0.7% 
2008–09  (median, 2008-09 prices)  £8.00  £12.49  £9.20 
2009–10  (median, 2008-09 prices)  £7.96  £12.76  £9.56 
Notes: Years refer to financial years. Figures are for the UK as a whole.  
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Labour Force Survey (April-June 1998 onwards). 
 
As would be expected given the trends in propensities to work part-time, men in 
couples saw a slight fall in their mean average hours worked between 1998–99 
and 2008–09. Women and lone parents saw relatively little change. There was a 
small reduction in hours worked and a slight increase in propensities to work 
part-time in 2009–10 across the board, following on from the recession.   
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In terms of earnings, lone parents had the lowest individual weekly earnings 
throughout the period, which is unsurprising given that they tend to work lower 
hours, on average, than men in couples. In term of growth, all groups saw robust 
real-terms growth up to 2004–05, as well as a slowdown between 2004–05 and 
2008–09.  However,  growth  was  clearly  fastest  for  lone  parents  in  the  early 
period  and  slowest  for  men  in  couples.  Lone  parents  then  saw  the  biggest 
slowdown after 2004–05. The trends in wage rates largely match the trends in 
weekly earnings, with strong wage growth in the early period (particularly for 
lone parents in work) and a generalised slowdown after 2004–05. In 2009–10, 
lone parents then saw reductions in earnings and hourly pay, with continued 
slow growth for men and women in couples.   
Number of workers 
Figure  6.3 shows the  median  earnings,  mean  hours and  median  hourly  wage 
rates of lone parents, single earner men and women (i.e. men and women in 
couples who are the only earner in their family), and men and women in dual-
earner couples for the period from 1998–99 through to 2008–09. All values are 
indexed to 1.00 in 1998–99 and are presented as three year moving-averages in 
order to smooth out year-to-year variation from sampling error (1998-99 thus 
represents the average for 1997-98, 1998-99 and 1999-00). The levels for 1998–
99 and 2008–09 are shown in Table 6.3, with changes over this period broken 
down into the period prior to and after 2004–05.  
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Figure 6.3 Earnings, hours and wage rates by family type, sex and number of 
earners in family 
(a) Median Earnings 
 
(b) Mean Hours 
 
(c) Median Hourly Wage Rates 
 
Notes: Years refer to financial years. Figures are for the UK as a whole.  
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The figure shows that lone parents and single-earner women experienced strong 
real-terms growth in earnings up to 2002–03. Coming from a low base (as shown 
in Table 6.3) this may partly be able to explain the reduced incidence of child 
poverty among lone parents working part-time, as nearly 1 in 2 do, and amongst 
couples with a single earner up to 2004–05.  
Men experienced relatively slow growth up to 2004–05, with women in dual-
earner families experiencing growth somewhere in the middle. Although male 
earnings growth is slightly depressed by reductions in hours and single-earner 
women slightly inflated by increases in hours, it is clear that patterns in earnings 
growth were largely driven by trends in hourly wages rather than hours up to 
2002–03.  
From 2002–03 onwards, almost all groups experienced stagnation or real-terms 
falls in earnings, largely driven by patterns in hourly wages. The only exceptions 
are women in dual-earner couples, who continued to see earnings growth, albeit 
relatively weak. The group that experienced the largest drops in earnings was 
single earner men. Falls in their real-terms earnings and hourly wages mean that 
their median earnings were unchanged compared with 1998–99 and their hourly 
wages  only  5%  greater.  It  thus  seems  likely  that  the  increase  in  poverty 
experienced  by  single-earner  couples  since  2004–05  is  at  least  partly  being 
driven by real-terms falls in the hourly wages received by male single-earners.  
However,  we  are  not  observing  the  earnings,  hours  and  wage  of  the  same 
individuals  over  time.  Over  the  ten  year  period,  the  composition  and 
characteristics of each group are likely to have changed. It is important to note 
that such shifts could well explain some of the trends observed above.   
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workers  All  Single 
Earners 
Two 





1998–99 (% of parents)  49.5  7.3  4.2  5.1  49.4  55.9  55.2 
1998–99 to 2004–05  (%pt change)  -2.2  1.3  1.1  1.2  -4.5  -1.3  -1.1 
2004–05 to 2008–09  (%pt change)  0.9  2.1  1.1  1.3  -0.5  -2.8  -3 




1998–99  (£)  181.89  495.00  498.89  497.59  177.99  194.88  194.88 
1998–99 to 2004–05  (%change)  4.8  0.6  1.6  1.3  4.6  3.7  3.7 
2004–05 to 2008–09  (% change)  -1.0  -1.6  0.1  0.1  -2.4  0.9  0.9 
2008–09   (£)  231.00  481.00  550.00  538.00  212.00  250.00  250.00 
Hours 
1998–99  (hours)  26.8  43.6  44.4  44.2  26.2  24.8  25.0 
1998–99 to 2004–05  (change in hours)  0.4  -2.0  -2.0  -2.0  1.3  -0.3  -0.3 
2004–05 to 2008–09  (change in hours)  -0.4  -1.0  -0.7  -0.8  -1.0  0.5  0.4 
2008–09   (hours)  26.9  40.6  41.7  41.4  26.5  25.0  25.1 
Hourly Pay 
1998–99  (£)  6.58  10.64  11.04  10.96  6.63  7.34  7.30 
1998–99 to 2004–05  (% change)  4.3  1.3  2.0  1.9  3.6  3.6  3.4 
2004–05 to 2008–09  (% change)  -1.5  -0.9  0.7  0.4  -1.6  0.7  0.7 
2008–09  (£)  8.00  11.11  12.78  12.49  7.70  9.34  9.20 
Notes: Years refer to financial years. Figures are for the UK as a whole.  
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Labour Force Survey (April-June 1998 onwards).   
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We have also broken down labour market trends experienced by lone parents, 
and men and women in couples by other individual and family characteristics:  
age  of  youngest  child;  number  of  children;  education  level;  age  of  parents; 
ethnicity;  and,  region.  In  what  follows  we  summarise  and  illustrate  the  key 
points. 
Age of Youngest Child 
Table A4.1 shows labour market trends amongst lone parents, men in couples 
and women in couples (as per Tables 6.2) broken down by age of the youngest 
child in the family. It shows that the large increase in employment amongst lone 
parents over this period was seen for all lone parents, no matter the age of the 
youngest  child,  (though  there  was  a  slightly  larger  increase  for  lone  parents 
whose  youngest  child  was  over  10).  This  could  have  helped  drive  some  the 
reduced incidence of child poverty amongst lone parents with children under 10, 
alongside  tax  and  benefit  changes.  Furthermore,  these  groups  experienced 
robust earning growth up to 2004–05. There was a generalised slowdown in 
earnings for lone parents and couples by age of youngest child after 2004–05, 
which we have already pointed to as a potential driver of increased child poverty 
between 2004–05 and 2008–09.  
Number of Children  
Table A4.2 shows labour market trends amongst lone parents, men in couples 
and women in couples broken down by the number of children in the family. 
Again, there were large increases in employment amongst lone parents, but no 
particularly large differences according to the number of children in the family. 
The small increase in employment amongst couples appears largely unrelated to 
the number of children in the family, the only exception being women with three 
or more children who saw a small decrease in employment across this period. 
The  post  2004–05  slowdown  in  earnings  and  wage  was  not  concentrated 
amongst families with different numbers of children either.  
Education Level 
Table A4.3 shows labour market trends amongst lone parents, men in couples 
and  women  in  couples  broken  down  by  parent’s  highest  education  level 
(Graduate  or  equivalent,  non-graduate  qualifications,  none  or  less  than  the 
equivalent of 5 GCSEs A*-C). Unfortunately, we were not able to do an equivalent 
decomposition  of  the  change  in  child  poverty  by  qualification  due  to  the 
unavailability of such data in the Family Resources Survey.   
The first thing to note is that employment, earnings, hours and hourly pay are all 
higher for those with higher levels of qualifications. In terms of changes over 
time, all lone parents saw higher levels of employment over time (particularly 
those  with  qualifications  below  degree  level).  Furthermore,  the  increase  in 
employment amongst all lone parents was greater than amongst any individual 
groups; this reflects the fact that lone parents have become much more likely to 
possess degrees or other qualifications over time (and such groups are more 
likely to find employment). For example, in 2008-09, 19% of lone parents had  
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degree-level qualifications compared with 12% in 1998-99. Therefore, some of 
the  increase  in  employment  amongst  lone  parents,  and  its  effect  on  poverty, 
could well be driven by the fact that this group has become more highly qualified 
over time. Also noteworthy in terms of employment prospects is the fact that the 
employment  prospects  of  low-skilled  women  in  couples  have  declined 
continuously across time. Low skilled lone parents and women in couples have 
also become much more likely to be in part-time work.  
Low skilled lone parents saw the largest increase in earnings up to 2004–05. 
Coming  from  a  low  base,  this  is  likely  to  have  contributed  to  the  reduced 
incidence of poverty amongst working lone parents. After 2004–05, there was a 
generalised slowdown in earnings and wages across education levels.  
Over the period as a whole, low skilled men in couples were the only group to see 
a  real-terms  fall  in  their  earnings  over  the  ten  years.  This  partly  reflects  a 
reduction in their average hours worked. However, their wages only grew by 
0.6% per year on average in real-terms, the slowest across all education groups.  
Age of Parents 
Table A4.4 shows labour market trends amongst lone parents, men in couples 
and  women  in  couples  broken  down  by  age  of  parents.    Lone  parents  aged 
between 25 and 34 experienced the biggest rise in employment up to 2004–05, 
followed  by  lone  parents  aged  35-44.  Young  (under  25)  men  and  women  in 
couples also saw large rises in employment up to 2004–05. However, after 2004–
05  young  men  have  seen  a  very  large  fall  in  employment,  mostly  during  the 
current recession. Young men in couples have also become more likely to work 
part-time, particularly in the period after 2004–05. Lone parents and women are 
still much more likely to work part-time than men in couples, though they have 
become  slightly  less  likely  to  over  time.  Earnings  generally  grew  faster  for 
younger parents in the period up to 2004–05, the gradients being clearest for 
lone parents and women. After 2004–05, there was a slowdown in earnings and 
hourly pay growth across the board.  
Region 
Table A4.5 shows labour market trends amongst parents broken down by region 
or country in the UK. We do not separate out lone parents and couples due to the 
relatively small sample sizes in individual years. We saw earlier that between 
1998–99  and  2004–05,  the  fall  in  child  poverty  was  driven  largely  by  the 
northern regions of England and by Scotland. These were the regions of the UK 
where parental employment rose by the most. More recently, child poverty has 
risen  particularly  sharply  in  the  West  Midlands,  where  the  impact  of  the 
recession on parental employment has been the most marked. In fact, the West 
Midlands is the only region where child poverty is higher than it was in 1998–99 
and  the  only  region  where  employment  is  lower.  The  two  facts  are  almost 
certainly related.   
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After 2004–05, there was a generalised slowdown in earnings and a generalised 
slowdown  in  hourly  pay,  particularly  in  the  West  and  East  Midlands  where 
earnings fell by more than 1% per year on average in real-terms up to 2008–09.  
Ethnicity  
Table  A4.6  shows  labour  market  trends  amongst  parents  broken  down  by 
ethnicity. Similarly to the analysis by region, we do not separate out lone parents 
and couples due to the relatively small sample sizes in individual years.  
In both 1998–99 and 2008–09, the employment rate was highest amongst White 
parents,  and  lowest  amongst  Pakistani  and  Bangladeshi  parents.  However, 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi parents both saw the largest increases in employment 
over this period, even after 2004–05; Chinese parents also saw large increases in 
employment over the ten years. The proportions of Pakistani, Bangaladeshi 
and  Chinese  parents  who  chose  to  work  part-time  also  increased 
substantially between 1998–99 and 2008–09 (the latter increase confined to 
the period after 2004–05).  
Between 1998–99 and 2004–05, earnings growth was relatively robust across all 
ethnic groups, with Black African, Indian and Chinese and parents seeing the 
fastest growth in earnings. The only exceptions were Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
parents, who saw a fall in their earnings, but this is likely to be driven by their 
increased propensity to work part-time and a related fall in their average hours 
worked. After 2004–05, there was a generalised slowdown in earnings and wage 
growth (Pakistani and Bangaldeshi parents being the only exceptions).   
7.  Conclusions 
The Child Poverty Act, which passed into law earlier this year, commits current 
and future governments to reducing the rate of relative income child poverty in 
the UK to 10% by 2020. The previous government had a high-profile target to 
halve  the  number  of  children  in  poverty  between  1998  and  2010.  It  is  now 
accepted that this target has not been met. In this paper, we have looked at the 
progress  made  towards  this  goal  under  the  previous  Labour  administrations, 
pinpointing the reasons why child poverty fell and why it did not fall further.  
Our work shows that direct tax and benefit policy has a very strong influence on 
this measure of child poverty. It plays an important role in explaining at least 
three  things:  the  large  overall  reduction  in  child  poverty  since  1998–99;  the 
striking slowdown in progress towards the child poverty targets between 2004–
05  and  2007–08;  and  some  of  the  variation  in  child  poverty  trends  between 
different  groups  of  children.  Given  that  the  poverty  measure  in  question  is 
exclusively income-based, this may not come as a great surprise. 
We have also shown that, in trying to reduce relative poverty amongst children, 
the  previous government was trying to swim against the tide. In most years, 
earnings grow in real terms, generally pushing up median household income and 
thus the relative poverty line. Had the previous government just indexed benefit  
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rates and tax thresholds to prices since 1998–99, earnings growth would have 
acted to increase child poverty by about 4 percentage points by 2010–11.  
Changes in the employment and earnings of parents also played an important 
role. For example, between 1998–99 and 2004–05, the fall in child poverty was 
driven largely by the northern regions of England and by Scotland, the regions of 
Great Britain where parental employment rose the most. More recently, child 
poverty has risen particularly sharply in the West Midlands, where the impact of 
the recession on parental employment has been the most marked. And the rise in 
child poverty since 2004–05 has been felt most by the children of one-earner 
couples, whose earnings have been falling in real-terms.   
If the UK hit its target for relative child poverty in 2020–21, it would be the 
lowest level since our comparable series began in 1961, but this would require 
the rate of child poverty to fall by 8.4 percentage points from its projected 2010–
11 level. It seems inconceivable that a change of that scale could be achieved 
without any changes to direct taxes or benefits. Modelling by the Child Poverty 
Unit33 under the previous government suggested that the 2020–21 target would 
be missed by 850,000 even under an extremely optimistic scenario for parental 
work patterns, a fall in the amount of benefits which go unclaimed, and a fall in 
teenage  pregnancies  (850,000  is  the  total  of  the  rows  in  Table  1.A  marked 
“Other” and “Improved skills...”; both figures reflect assumptions made by the 
civil servants, and neither is associated with a specific policy change). 
But it seems equally inconceivable that a change of that scale could be achieved 
through fiscal  redistribution alone. 18 months ago, IFS researchers estimated 
that reducing child poverty to 10% would cost at least £19 billion per year (in 
current prices) by 2020–21. As well as looking infeasible in the current fiscal 
climate, that estimate assumed no behavioural change, an unrealistic assumption 
when considering tax and benefit reforms of this scale.  
So if the poverty target won’t be met with no extra spending on welfare benefits, 
and probably won’t be met even with lots of extra spending on welfare benefits, 
what  is  the  prognosis  for  child  poverty?  One  response  might  be  for  the 
Government to change the definition of child poverty. Upon taking  office, the 
Prime  Minister  asked  Frank  Field  MP  to  conduct  an  Independent  Review  on 
Poverty and Life  Chances, and  Mr Field has spoken about a  need for “a  new 
measurement that centres on future life chances and opportunities – a new index 
of  life  opportunities34”;  on  the  other  hand,  he  imagines  that  this  would 
“supplement  the  existing  financial  measures  [of  child  poverty]”,  not  replace 
them.  







So if the current and future governments are serious about the target, then the 
evidence suggests that they will need not only to find fiscal resources to increase 
state  support  for  families  with  children,  but  also  to  improve  labour  market 
outcomes  for  low-income  parents,  and  to  reduce  inequalities  in  earnings, 
whether through changes in the labour market or a more progressive tax regime. 
Readers will have their own views on how likely any of these will be.  
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Appendix 1. Further decomposition results (supplementary to Section 4) 
Table A1.1. Decomposition of changes in BHC child poverty between 1998–99 and 2008–09 by parental disability status  
Notes: Great Britain only. Figures may not sum due to rounding. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Family Resources Surveys 1998–99, 2004–05 and 2008–09. 
 
Child poverty rate 
(%) 
Proportion of 












































disabled  30.2  17.1  27.3  2.4  2.1  2.1  +0.0  -0.3  -0.3  +0.0  +0.2  +0.2  +0.0  -0.1  -0.1 
No parent 
disabled  25.9  21.4  22.0  97.6  97.9  97.9  +0.0  -4.4  -4.4  +0.0  +0.5  +0.5  +0.0  -3.8  -3.8 
All  26.0  21.3  22.1  100  100  100  +0.0  -4.7  -4.7  +0.0  +0.8  +0.8  +0.0  -3.9  -3.9  
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Table A1.2. Decomposition of changes in BHC child poverty between 1998–99 and 2008–09 by ethnicity
35  
Notes: Great Britain only. Figures may not sum due to rounding. For children of couple parents who have different ethnicities, we randomly select the ethnicity of 
one parent. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Family Resources Surveys 1998–99, 2004–05 and 2008–09. 
                                                      
35 Since 2001–02, the Family Resources Survey has included more finely disaggregated ethnicity categories. Hence, for the period between 2004–
05 and 2008–09, it is possible to do a more detailed decomposition by ethnicity. We do this in Table A1.3. 
 
Child poverty rate 
(%) 
Proportion of 











































White  23.8  19.4  18.9  90.4  88.0  85.9  +0.0  -3.9  -3.9  +0.1  -0.5  -0.4  +0.1  -4.3  -4.2 
Black  43.5  30.0  45.2  2.5  3.1  4.2  +0.1  -0.4  -0.3  +0.2  +0.6  +0.7  +0.3  +0.1  +0.4 
Asian  51.0  39.7  45.3  5.6  5.8  6.5  +0.0  -0.6  -0.6  +0.2  0.3  +0.5  +0.2  -0.3  -0.1 
Other  34.4  32.3  29.3  1.5  3.1  3.3  +0.2  +0.0  +0.1  +0.0  -0.1  -0.1  +0.1  -0.1  +0.0 
All  26.0  21.3  22.1  100  100  100  +0.3  -0.5  -4.7  +0.4  +0.4  +0.8  +0.8  -4.7  -3.9  
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Table A1.3. Detailed decomposition of changes in BHC child poverty between 2004–05 and 2008–09 by ethnicity 
Notes: Great Britain only. Figures may not sum due to rounding. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Family Resources Surveys 1998–99, 2004–05 and 2008–09. 
 
Child poverty rate (%)  Proportion of children 
(%)  2004–05 to 2008–09 





Total change (ppts) 
White  19.4  18.9  88.0  85.9  +0.1  -0.5  -0.4 
Black Caribbean  21.1  31.0  1.5  1.4  -0.0  +0.1  +0.1 
Black African  36.7  53.3  1.5  2.7  +0.3  +0.4  +0.6 
Indian  27.7  23.4  2.3  2.1  -0.0  -0.1  -0.1 
Pakistani  47.5  56.2  2.0  3.3  +0.4  +0.2  +0.6 
Bangladeshi  54.1  64.0  1.2  0.8  -0.1  +0.1  +0.0 
Chinese  18.4  24.7  0.2  0.3  -0.0  +0.0  +0.0 
Other Asian  31.0  21.1  0.6  1.0  +0.0  -0.1  -0.1 
Mixed white/black  13.3  30.4  0.5  0.7  -0.0  +0.1  +0.1 
Mixed white/Asian  27.1  30.8  0.3  0.3  +0.0  +0.0  +0.0 
Other  39.9  33.8  1.8  1.4  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2 
All  21.3  22.1  100  100  +0.5  +0.2  +0.8  
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Table A1.4. Decomposition of changes in BHC child poverty between 1998–99 and 2008–09 by parental age  
Notes: Great Britain only. Figures may not sum due to rounding. For couple parents, we take the mean of their ages. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Family Resources Surveys 1998–99, 2004–05 and 2008–09. 
 
Child poverty rate 
(%) 
Proportion of 











































Under 25  51.7  39.4  46.4  4.0  4.4  4.5  +0.1  -0.5  -0.4  +0.2  +0.3  +0.6  +0.4  -0.2  +0.1 
25-34  30.3  25.2  23.8  34.3  27.7  24.2  -0.3  -1.6  -1.8  -0.1  -0.4  -0.5  -0.3  -1.9  -2.2 
35-44  23.2  19.1  20.0  46.8  50.9  49.5  -0.1  -2.0  -2.1  +0.0  +0.5  +0.5  -0.1  -1.5  -1.6 
45+  18.1  17.1  18.6  14.9  17.1  20.8  -0.1  -0.1  -0.3  -0.1  +0.3  +0.1  -0.3  +0.1  -0.2 
All  26.0  21.3  22.1  100  100  100  -0.4  -4.3  -4.7  +0.0  +0.7  +0.8  -0.3  -3.6  -3.9  
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Table A1.5. Decomposition of changes in BHC child poverty between 1998–99 and 2008–09 by housing tenure 
Notes: Great Britain only. Figures may not sum due to rounding. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Family Resources Surveys 1998–99, 2004–05 and 2008–09. 
 
Child poverty rate 
(%) 
Proportion of 












































renters  25.3  28.5  31.1  3.2  2.6  3.5  -0.0  +0.1  +0.1  +0.1  +0.1  +0.2  +0.0  +0.2  +0.2 
Social 
renters  55.5  45.9  46.4  25.3  23.1  21.3  -0.6  -2.3  -2.9  -0.5  +0.1  -0.3  -1.1  -2.1  -3.2 
Home-
owners  14.4  12.4  13.5  66.7  67.9  66.7  -0.1  -1.3  -1.4  +0.1  +0.8  +0.9  +0.0  -0.6  -0.6 
Other  32.7  24.5  24.8  4.8  6.4  8.5  +0.1  -0.5  -0.4  +0.1  +0.0  +0.1  +0.2  -0.5  -0.4 
All  26.0  21.3  22.1  100  100  100  -0.6  -4.0  -4.7  -0.2  +1.0  +0.8  -0.9  -3.0  -3.9  
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Appendix  2:  Further  micro-simulation  results  (supplementary  to 
Section 5) 
Table A2.1.Simulations of relative child poverty in the UK in 2010–11 under 
different direct tax and benefit systems  
Direct tax and benefit 
system in 2010–11 
Simulated child poverty 
in 2010–11 (BHC) 
Simulated child poverty 
in 2010–11 (AHC) 
  %  Million  %  Million 
Actual 2010–11 system  18.4  2.4  26.0  3.4 
         
Default uprating since:         
   2009–10   19.5  2.6  27.8  3.7 
   2008–09   19.8  2.6  28.2  3.7 
   2007–08   21.4  2.8  30.3  4.0 
   2006–07   21.5  2.9  30.4  4.0 
   2005–06   22.0  2.9  30.9  4.1 
   2004–05   22.0  2.9  31.1  4.1 
   2003–04   23.3  3.1  32.7  4.3 
   2002–03   26.2  3.5  34.1  4.5 
   2001–02   27.2  3.6  34.8  4.6 
   2000–01   29.4  3.9  36.3  4.8 
   1999–00   31.9  4.2  38.7  5.1 
   1998–99   32.1  4.3  38.9  5.2 
         
GDP uprating since:         
   2009–10   16.2  2.1  24.5  3.3 
   2008–09   18.3  2.4  27.4  3.6 
   2007–08   19.6  2.6  28.9  3.8 
   2006–07   18.9  2.5  27.9  3.7 
   2005–06   18.8  2.5  27.7  3.7 
   2004–05   18.3  2.4  27.3  3.6 
   2003–04   18.7  2.5  27.7  3.7 
   2002–03   20.5  2.7  30.7  4.1 
   2001–02   20.4  2.7  30.7  4.1 
   2000–01   22.3  2.9  32.3  4.3 
   1999–00   27.5  3.6  35.9  4.8 
   1998–99   27.7  3.7  35.4  4.7 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Family Resources Survey 2007–08 and 2008–09 using 
TAXBEN and assumptions specified in the text.  
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Appendix 3. The Shapley-Shorrocks decomposition: technical details 
In  Section  5  we  presented  a  Shapley-Shorrocks  decomposition  (Shorrocks, 
1999), separating the total projected change in child poverty between 1998–99 
and 2010–11 into three contributory factors:  
1.  The direct impact of tax and benefit reforms. 
2.  Population change. 
3.  Growth in financial variables. 
This is done by manipulating the numbers  in Table 5.3, which is reproduced 
below for reference. Here we outline the mechanics of the decomposition. In the 
exposition below, we take ‘no tax and benefit reforms’ to mean ‘1998–99 default 
uprating’. Of course, the mechanics of the decomposition are identical for the 
case where we take ‘no tax and benefit reforms’ to mean ‘GDP-uprating’. 
Table A3.1. Simulations of relative (BHC) income child poverty in Great 
Britain in 2010–11 under the actual 2010–11 tax and benefit system and an 
unreformed 1998–99 system, for the 1998–99 population and the 2010–11 
population.  
Direct tax and benefit system in 
2010–11 
Simulated child poverty rate (%) in 2010–
11  
  1998–99 population  2010–11 population 
1998–99 default-uprated  29.9  32.1 
1998–99 GDP-uprated  22.3  27.7 
Actual 2010–11 system  14.6  18.4 
Memo: Actual 1998–99 rate  26.0  26.0 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Family Resources Survey 1998–99, 2007–08 and 2008–
09 using TAXBEN and assumptions specified in the text.  
The direct impact of tax and benefit reforms 
We have data on the population in the base year (1998–99) and the end year 
(2010–11). One could thus estimate the direct impact of tax and benefit reforms 
between 1998–99 and 2010–11 using either the base year population or the end 
year population. There is no a priori reason for preferring either.36 In either case, 
we take the difference between projected child poverty in 2010 –11 under the 
                                                      
36 Intuitively, if the results differ when we use the base year and end year populations, 
it means that changes in the distribution of characteristics in the population over time 
have changed the way that tax and benefit reforms affect child poverty. For example, a 
reduction in the number of children of a certain type would reduce the impact of tax 
and benefit reforms that redistribute towards that type. Hence, using just the base year 
population or just the end year population to simulate the impact of tax and benefit 




actual  2010–11  tax  and  benefit  system  and  under  an  unreformed  1998–99 
system. Hence, in percentage points, the direct impact on child poverty of tax and 
benefit reforms between 1998–99 and 2010–11 would be: 
  14.6 – 29.9 = - 15.3 using a base-year population. 
  18.4 – 32.1 = - 13.7 using an end-year population. 
Note that we uprate financial variables amongst the base-year population to end-
year levels (i.e. we give the 1998–99 population 2010–11 levels of earnings) in 
order  to  separate  the  impact  of  tax  and  benefit  reforms  from  the  impact  of 
earnings growth. 
The Shapley-Shorrocks decomposition involves averaging the estimated impacts 
of  tax  and  benefit  reforms  with  a  base-year  population  and  an  end-year 
population. Hence, the estimate of the direct impact (in percentage points) of tax 
and benefit reforms between 1998–99 and 2010-11 on child poverty in 2010–11 
is: 
  (-15.3 – 13.7) / 2 = - 14.5  
The impact of population change 
Changes  in  the  characteristics  of  the  population  over  time  may  change  child 
poverty rates, if groups of children at different risks of poverty change in relative 
size. But the extent to which population change affects child poverty can also 
depend on the tax and benefit system. For example, if Group A is at a higher risk 
of poverty than Group B, overall poverty will tend to increase when Group A 
grows in relative size; but this effect will be smaller if the tax and benefit system 
redistributes more towards Group A. 
Therefore, we can estimate the impact on child poverty of population change 
using an unreformed 1998–99 tax and benefit system or the 2010–11 system, 
and we may get different results. In each case, we simply compare the simulated 
child poverty rate in 2010–11 amongst a 1998–99 population and a 2010-11 
population. We obtain: 
  18.4 – 14.6 = + 3.8 using a 2010–11 tax and benefit system. 
  32.1 – 29.9 = + 2.2 using an unreformed 1998–99 tax and benefit system. 
Again, note that the 1998–99 population we use have had their earnings uprated 
to 2010–11 levels. 
The  Shapley-Shorrocks  decomposition  involves  averaging  the  effects  of 
population change estimated using a base-year tax and benefit system and an 
end-year system.  Hence, the  estimate  of the  impact (in  percentage points)  of 
population change between 1998–99 and 2010-11 on child poverty in 2010–11 
is:  
  (3.8 + 2.1) / 2 = + 3.0  
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A note on averaging the ‘base-weighted’ and ‘end-weighted’ results 
Since, as discussed, there is no a priori reason to use either the ‘base-weighted’ 
or ‘end-weighted’ results in isolation, averaging the results as per the Shapley-
Shorrocks  decomposition  has the  appeal of symmetry. It  also means that the 
total impact of all three contributory factors will add up to the total change in 
child poverty over the period under investigation. In any case, as we have seen 
for the effect of both tax and benefit reform and population change, the results 
obtained  using  the  ‘base-weighted’  and  ‘end-weighted’  results  are  not 
dramatically different. 
The impact of growth in financial variables 
This is the third and final contributory factor. We obtain the simulated level of 
child  poverty  in  2010–11  under  the  scenario  where  the  level  of  financial 
variables (such as earnings) was the only thing that had changed since 1998–99, 
i.e. the simulated 2010–11 level amongst a 1998–99 population living under an 
unreformed  1998–99  tax  and  benefit  system,  but  with  2010–11  levels  of 
financial variables. We then compare this with the level of child poverty in 1998–
99. 
Hence, the estimated effect on child poverty in 2010–11 (in percentage points) of 
growth in financial variables between 1998–99 and 2010-11 is: 




Table A4.1 Labour Market Trends for lone parents and parents in couples by sex and age of youngest child 
Age of Youngest Child 
Lone Parents  Men in couples  Women in couples 
Under 
5  5-9  Over 
10  All  Under 
5  5-9  Over 
10  All  Under 
5  5-9  Over 
10  All 
Employment 
1998–99 (%)  29.0  48.5  62.6  45.8  90.0  90.1  88.9  89.7  58.1  73.4  79.0  68.8 
98–99 to 04–05 (ppt change)  5.9  7.1  5.4  8.3  0.9  1.2  1.8  1.3  0.9  1.6  1.2  1.7 
04–05 to 08–09 (ppt change)  1.7  1.2  3.4  1.7  -0.9  0.4  -0.2  -0.4  2.4  -1.5  1.0  0.4 





1998–99 (%)  62.0  55.5  38.8  49.5  5.2  4.9  4.9  5.1  61.6  59.5  46.5  55.2 
98–99 to 04–05 (ppt change)  0.1  -0.7  -1.6  -2.2  1.5  1.0  1.0  1.2  -1.1  -0.1  -0.7  -1.1 
04–05 to 08–09 (ppt change)  2.1  -1.9  2.3  0.9  1.9  1.3  0.6  1.3  -3.3  -5.4  -1.5  -3.0 




1998–99 (median, 08-09 prices)  140  161  240  182  474  500  522  498  195  171  205  195 
98–99 to 04–05 (avg % change)  4.5  4.7  2.9  4.1  1.8  1.5  1.0  1.1  3.7  4.1  4.1  3.1 
04–05 to 08–09 (avg % change)  -0.7  -1.1  -1.4  -0.8  -1.3  0.3  1.1  0.0  0.9  1.4  -0.7  0.7 
2008–09  (median, 08-09 prices)  177  203  269  231  500  554  577  538  250  231  254  250 
Hours 
1998–99 (mean hours)  22.9  25.0  30.3  26.8  44.2  44.3  44.1  44.2  22.5  24.4  27.8  25.0 
98–99 to 04–05 (change in hours)  -0.6  0.5  0.0  0.4  -2.3  -2.0  -1.8  -2.0  -1.1  -0.2  -0.1  -0.3 
04–05 to 08–09 (change in hours)  -1.0  0.6  -0.6  -0.4  -1.2  -0.6  -0.4  -0.8  0.1  1.6  0.4  0.4 
2008–09  (mean hours)  21.3  26.2  29.7  26.9  40.7  41.8  42.0  41.4  21.5  25.7  28.1  25.1 
Hourly Pay 
1998–99 (median, 08-09 prices)  5.98  6.50  7.05  6.58  10.45  11.07  11.55  10.96  8.08  6.91  6.96  7.30 
98–99 to 04–05 (avg % change)  4.2  4.4  3.9  3.7  2.1  2.0  1.6  1.6  3.5  3.8  3.5  2.9 
04–05 to 08–09 (avg % change)  -1.5  -1.9  -1.3  -1.2  -0.6  1.0  0.9  0.4  0.2  0.9  0.5  0.6 
2008–09  (median, 08-09 prices)  7.19  7.82  8.42  8.00  11.55  12.97  13.16  12.49  10.00  8.94  8.75  9.20 
Notes: Years refer to financial years. Figures are for the UK as a whole.  
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Labour Force Survey (April-June 1998 onwards).  
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Table A4.2 Labour Market Trends for lone parents and parents in couples by sex and number of children 
Number of Children 
Lone Parents  Men in couples  Women in couples 
1  2  3 or 
more  All  1  2  3 or 
more  All  1  2  3 or 
more  All 
Employment 
1998–99 (%)  51.3  46.5  27.9  45.8  90.0  91.6  84.7  89.7  73.2  70.7  55.6  68.8 
98–99 to 04–05 (ppt change)  7.4  8.0  7.8  8.3  0.7  1.1  2.3  1.3  2.1  1.9  -1.2  1.7 
04–05 to 08–09 (ppt change)  1.7  1.0  3.4  1.7  0.4  -0.6  -1.3  -0.4  1.1  0.0  -1.0  0.4 





1998–99 (%)  45.3  51.9  64.6  49.5  4.9  4.8  5.9  5.1  47.6  58.7  65.4  55.2 
98–99 to 04–05 (ppt change)  -1.8  -1.4  -4.7  -2.2  1.4  0.7  2.4  1.2  -0.9  -0.3  -3.2  -1.1 
04–05 to 08–09 (ppt change)  -0.2  2.9  -0.3  0.9  0.9  1.4  2.1  1.3  -2.7  -3.1  -0.9  -3.0 




1998–99 (median, 08-09 prices)  210  169  123  182  465  520  498  498  221  179  151  195 
98–99 to 04–05 (avg % change)  3.3  4.6  9.3  4.1  1.6  1.2  0.9  1.1  3.6  3.6  4.6  3.1 
04–05 to 08–09 (avg % change)  -1.1  -1.0  -3.2  -0.8  -0.6  0.8  -0.4  0.0  0.1  1.4  0.4  0.7 
2008–09  (median, 08-09 prices)  245  212  185  231  500  577  519  538  275  235  200  250 
Hours 
1998–99 (mean hours)  28.1  26.4  21.5  26.8  43.9  44.3  44.7  44.2  26.8  24.3  22.3  25.0 
98–99 to 04–05 (change in hours)  0.5  -0.2  1.3  0.4  -2.1  -1.8  -2.4  -2.0  -0.5  -0.4  -0.2  -0.3 
04–05 to 08–09 (change in hours)  -0.5  -0.4  0.3  -0.4  -0.6  -0.8  -1.3  -0.8  0.5  0.3  0.3  0.4 
2008–09  (mean hours)  28.1  25.8  23.2  26.9  41.2  41.7  41.0  41.4  26.8  24.2  22.4  25.1 
Hourly Pay 
1998–99 (median, 08-09 prices)  6.82  6.50  5.75  6.58  10.39  11.45  10.78  10.96  7.52  7.28  6.65  7.30 
98–99 to 04–05 (avg % change)  3.8  4.7  5.2  3.7  2.0  2.0  1.8  1.6  3.7  3.1  4.3  2.9 
04–05 to 08–09 (avg % change)  -1.5  -1.6  -1.0  -1.2  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.1  1.1  0.8  0.6 
2008–09  (median, 08-09 prices)  8.05  8.00  7.50  8.00  11.83  13.09  12.16  12.49  10.00  11.00  12.00  9.20 
Notes: Years refer to financial years. Figures are for the UK as a whole.  
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Labour Force Survey (April-June 1998 onwards).  
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Table A4.3 Labour Market Trends for lone parents and parents in couples by sex and education level 
Education Level 
Lone Parents  Men in couples  Women in couples 
Grad  Non-
Grad  None  All  Grad  Non-
Grad  None  All  Grad  Non-
Grad  None  All 
Employment 
1998–99 (%)  78.2  52.1  31.1  45.8  96.1  92.1  79.5  89.7  81.9  72.0  55.0  68.8 
98–99 to 04–05 (ppt change)  2.1  6.7  4.2  8.3  0.1  0.6  1.6  1.3  0.2  1.0  -3.7  1.7 
04–05 to 08–09 (ppt change)  0.7  1.4  -1.5  1.7  -0.5  -0.8  0.2  -0.4  -0.1  0.7  -3.6  0.4 





1998–99 (%)  30.1  50.1  61.9  49.5  4.6  4.3  6.9  5.1  44.2  59.1  59.7  55.2 
98–99 to 04–05 (ppt change)  -0.8  0.5  -0.8  -2.2  1.2  1.0  2.1  1.2  -0.7  0.5  -0.8  -1.1 
04–05 to 08–09 (ppt change)  4.4  1.5  -2.8  0.9  0.2  1.0  3.7  1.3  0.4  -3.4  -3.8  -3.0 




1998–99 (median, 08-09 prices)  390  178  116  182  687  463  370  498  357  171  136  195 
98–99 to 04–05 (avg % change)  1.1  3.1  4.4  4.1  1.2  1.1  0.5  1.1  1.4  2.4  2.3  3.1 
04–05 to 08–09 (avg % change)  -0.3  -1.7  -0.8  -0.8  0.6  -0.8  -1.0  0.0  -0.4  -0.1  1.4  0.7 
2008–09  (median, 08-09 prices)  415  202  150  231  769  481  365  538  387  202  171  250 
Hours 
1998–99 (mean hours)  32.7  26.7  23.1  26.8  44.3  44.3  43.8  44.2  28.5  23.7  23.6  25.0 
98–99 to 04–05 (change in hours)  -0.2  -0.4  0.2  0.4  -2.0  -2.1  -2.4  -2.0  -1.0  -0.5  -0.6  -0.3 
04–05 to 08–09 (change in hours)  -1.4  -0.6  1.1  -0.4  -0.4  -0.5  -1.7  -0.8  -0.2  0.5  0.4  0.4 
2008–09  (mean hours)  31.1  25.6  24.5  26.9  42.0  41.8  39.6  41.4  27.3  23.7  23.5  25.1 
Hourly Pay 
1998–99 (median, 08-09 prices)  10.82  6.50  5.27  6.58  15.30  10.26  8.12  10.96  11.65  6.87  5.60  7.3 
98–99 to 04–05 (avg % change)  1.6  3.2  3.0  3.7  1.7  1.5  1.4  1.6  1.7  2.2  2.5  2.9 
04–05 to 08–09 (avg % change)  -0.5  -1.8  -0.6  -1.2  0.5  -0.5  -0.7  0.4  -0.2  0.0  0.0  0.6 
2008–09  (median, 08-09 prices)  11.78  7.40  6.30  8  17.65  11.13  8.60  12.49  13.02  7.97  6.67  9.2 
Notes: Years refer to financial years. Figures are for the UK as a whole.  






Table A4.4 Labour Market Trends for lone parents and parents in couples by sex and age of parent 
Age 
Lone Parents  Men in couples  Women in couples 
Under 
25  25–34  35–44  45+  All  Under 
25  25–34  35–44  45+  All  Under 
25  25–34  35–44  45+  All 
Employment 
1998–99 (%)  22.3  38.2  56.6  60.5  45.8  72.9  90.3  91.9  86.3  89.7  37.8  63.3  73.9  75.0  68.8 
98–99 to 04–05 (ppt change)  2.9  9.3  6.3  4.9  8.3  9.0  -0.3  0.9  3.0  1.3  5.0  -0.3  0.9  1.9  1.7 
04–05 to 08–09 (ppt change)  2.6  0.7  1.3  3.2  1.7  -12.4  0.2  -0.2  0.3  -0.4  -0.4  0.3  -0.4  2.5  0.4 





1998–99 (%)  73.0  58.5  45.2  36.5  49.5  9.4  4.9  4.5  5.9  5.1  68.2  58.8  54.9  48.3  55.2 
98–99 to 04–05 (ppt change)  -3.3  0.0  -1.4  -0.6  -2.2  -1.2  1.6  1.0  1.2  1.2  -2.1  -0.5  -0.5  -0.7  -1.1 
04–05 to 08–09 (ppt change)  -1.9  0.7  2.6  0.9  0.9  4.9  2.0  1.3  0.7  1.3  -6.5  -4.7  -2.7  -0.3  -3.0 




1998–99 (median, 08-09 prices)  99  146  210  285  182  275  450  520  543  498  117  182  195  225  195 
98–99 to 04–05 (avg % change)  5.7  4.8  3.8  1.3  4.1  1.2  0.9  1.0  1.4  1.1  5.1  3.8  3.9  3.3  3.1 
04–05 to 08–09 (avg % change)  0.4  -1.7  -1.0  -0.7  -0.8  0.1  -1.2  1.1  -0.1  0.0  -1.5  0.8  0.9  -0.2  0.7 
2008–09  (median, 08-09 prices)  140  180  253  298  231  298  450  577  590  538  148  235  254  271  250 
Hours 
1998–99 (mean hours)  19.2  24.4  28.0  31.0  26.8  41.5  44.4  44.5  43.6  44.2  20.7  23.6  25.4  26.9  25.0 
98–99 to 04–05 (change in hours)  1.1  -0.4  0.1  0.4  0.4  -2.1  -2.7  -1.8  -1.8  -2.0  -1.3  -1.3  -0.3  0.2  -0.3 
04–05 to 08–09 (change in hours)  -0.5  -0.4  -0.3  -1.1  -0.4  -0.7  -1.4  -0.8  -0.4  -0.8  -1.0  0.0  0.6  0.5  0.4 
2008–09  (mean hours)  19.8  23.6  27.7  30.3  26.9  38.7  40.4  41.9  41.4  41.4  18.4  22.3  25.6  27.6  25.1 
Hourly Pay 
1998–99 (median, 08-09 prices)  4.89  5.97  7.10  8.42  6.58  6.63  9.70  11.46  12.42  10.96  5.40  7.15  7.48  7.52  7.30 
98–99 to 04–05 (avg % change)  5.6  3.9  4.0  1.9  3.7  1.7  2.1  1.8  1.8  1.6  2.9  3.2  3.2  4.2  2.9 
04–05 to 08–09 (avg % change)  -2.7  -1.6  -1.7  -0.6  -1.2  -1.0  -1.6  1.0  0.0  0.4  0.3  0.3  1.5  -0.1  0.6 
2008–09  (median, 08-09 prices)  6.08  7.07  8.41  9.21  8.00  7.03  10.27  13.23  13.85  12.49  6.50  8.72  9.60  9.61  9.20 
Notes: Years refer to financial years. Figures are for the UK as a whole.  




Table A4.5 Labour Market Trends for parent by regions and countries of the UK 










Mids  Yorkshire 
North 
West  North  Scotland  Wales 
N. 
Ireland  All 
Employment 
1998–99 (%)  67.4  78.7  77.9  79.0  75.0  77.0  74.2  73.3  70.0  75.5  73.3  70.5  74.7 
98–99 to 04–05 (ppt change)  0.1  1.4  1.5  1.8  2.1  1.4  2.3  4.0  5.9  3.4  2.0  3.2  2.1 
04–05 to 08–09 (ppt change)  2.2  0.2  0.5  -0.1  -3.8  0.8  0.5  -2.6  0.0  1.5  1.4  3.9  0.1 





1998–99 (%)  25.4  28.6  30.0  29.9  27.9  28.9  29.3  27.4  29.2  27.6  26.8  23.1  28.0 
98–99 to 04–05 (ppt change)  -1.7  1.1  0.9  1.6  -0.2  -0.2  0.2  -0.1  1.6  0.3  0.9  0.9  0.3 
04–05 to 08–09 (ppt change)  2.2  -1.3  -1.2  0.4  0.5  0.9  -0.5  0.1  -3.0  0.8  -3.1  -0.1  -0.2 




1998–99 (median, 08-09 prices)  412  409  324  308  325  325  320  325  318  325  317  312  344 
98–99 to 04–05 (avg % change)  2.3  1.0  2.2  2.2  2.3  1.5  1.0  1.3  0.6  2.2  1.7  1.0  1.7 
04–05 to 08–09 (avg % change)  0.5  0.4  -0.2  0.4  -1.1  -1.2  -0.1  0.3  0.7  -0.1  -0.4  0.6  -0.5 
2008–09  (median, 08-09 prices)  481  442  365  356  356  339  337  356  340  369  346  338  375 
Hours 
1998–99 (mean hours)  35.5  35.3  34.6  34.9  35.1  35.5  34.9  34.8  34.1  35.3  35.5  36.1  35.1 
98–99 to 04–05 (change in hours)  -0.8  -1.6  -0.9  -1.8  -1.1  -1.5  -1.3  -1.4  -0.8  -1.4  -1.3  -0.9  -1.3 
04–05 to 08–09 (change in hours)  -0.6  -0.1  -0.5  -0.3  -0.5  -0.7  -0.4  -0.3  -0.1  -0.6  -0.3  -0.4  -0.4 
2008–09  (mean hours)  34.1  33.6  33.3  32.7  33.5  33.3  33.2  33.1  33.2  33.3  33.8  34.8  33.4 
Hourly Pay 
1998–99 (median, 08-09 prices)  10.99  10.39  8.39  8.31  8.49  8.44  8.33  8.70  8.46  8.83  8.44  8.08  9.03 
98–99 to 04–05 (avg % change)  2.5  2.4  2.9  2.9  2.5  2.8  2.4  2.1  1.9  2.9  1.8  2.5  2.6 
04–05 to 08–09 (avg % change)  0.2  0.0  -0.1  1.1  -0.1  -1.5  -1.2  0.3  0.3  0.3  1.3  0.6  -0.1 
2008–09  (median, 08-09 prices)  12.83  11.96  9.94  10.30  9.82  9.38  9.14  9.96  9.61  10.64  9.89  9.61  10.47 
Notes: Years refer to financial years. 





Table A4.6 Labour Market Trends for parents by ethnicity 










1998–99 (%)  76.0  68.4  61.3  73.4  41.7  33.9  65.0  57.1  74.7 
98–99 to 04–05 (ppt change)  2.7  2.4  -3.4  3.6  4.7  4.6  5.4  1.6  2.1 
04–05 to 08–09 (ppt change)  0.3  0.6  6.0  -1.8  4.8  7.2  3.8  5.0  0.1 





1998–99 (%)  28.3  25.4  22.7  20.0  21.9  19.8  23.4  29.0  28.0 
98–99 to 04–05 (ppt change)  0.4  -4.0  -1.0  0.0  5.4  22.9  -5.0  -3.4  0.3 
04–05 to 08–09 (ppt change)  -0.3  4.7  -1.6  0.7  4.9  1.8  11.6  -0.7  -0.2 




1998–99 (median, 08-09 prices)  347  351  325  325  283  156  390  314  344 
98–99 to 04–05 (avg % change)  1.6  2.2  2.7  3.6  -1.2  -1.5  5.1  2.9  1.7 
04–05 to 08–09 (avg % change)  -0.1  0.3  -1.3  -1.1  -0.1  6.0  -12.5  -4.7  -0.5 
2008–09  (median, 08-09 prices)  380  404  362  385  262  180  308  308  375 
Hours 
1998–99 (mean hours)  35.1  34.4  34.3  38.0  37.1  34.2  40.2  34.1  35.1 
98–99 to 04–05 (change in hours)  -1.3  0.3  0.6  -1.7  -3.2  -4.6  -2.5  0.2  -1.3 
04–05 to 08–09 (change in hours)  -0.3  -2.0  0.0  -1.1  -2.2  -1.1  -4.6  -1.2  -0.4 
2008–09  (mean hours)  33.5  32.7  34.9  35.1  31.7  28.6  33.1  33.1  33.4 
Hourly Pay 
1998–99 (median, 08-09 prices)  9.06  9.68  8.29  8.41  6.84  4.87  11.14  8.96  9.03 
98–99 to 04–05 (avg % change)  2.1  1.8  3.7  3.2  2.7  3.5  3.1  2.5  2.6 
04–05 to 08–09 (avg % change)  0.3  0.2  -2.2  -0.3  -2.9  3.1  -9.0  -4.5  -0.1 
2008–09  (median, 08-09 prices)  10.63  11.08  9.53  10.33  7.14  7.20  8.57  8.49  10.47 
Notes: Years refer to financial years. Figures are for the UK as a whole.  
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Labour Force Survey (April-June 1998 onwards).  
 